An Introduction to Developmental Psychology Book

Citations

The fundamental problem I propose to consider in these lectures is this: how can we combine that degree of individual initiative which is necessary for progress with the degree of social cohesion that is necessary for survival?

In all social animals, including man, co-operation and the unity of a group have some foundation in instinct.

This is most complete in ants and bees, which apparently are never tempted to anti-social actions and never deviate from devotion to the nest or the hive. Up to a point we may admire this unswerving devotion to public duty, but it has its drawbacks; ants and bees do not produce great works of art, or make scientific discoveries, or found religions teaching that all ants are sisters. Their social life, in fact, is mechanical, precise and static. We are willing that human life shall have an element of turbulence if thereby we can escape such evolutionary stagnation.

The strongest and most instinctively compelling of social groups was, and still is, the family.

The transition from the family to the small tribe was presumably biologically connected with the fact that hunting could be more efficient if it was cooperative, and from a very early time the cohesion of the tribe must have been increased and developed by conflicts with other tribes.

One of the things that cause stress and strain in human social life is that it is possible, up to a point, to become aware of rational grounds for a behaviour not prompted by natural instinct. But when such behaviour strains natural instinct too severely nature takes her revenge by producing either listlessness or destructiveness, either of which may cause a structure imposed by reason to break down.

From those early days down to modem times war has been the chief engine in enlarging the size of communities, and fear has increasingly replaced tribal solidarity as a source of social cohesion.

Always when we pass beyond the limits of the family it is the external enemy which supplies the cohesive force. In times of safety we can afford to hate our neighbour, but in times of danger - we must love him.

If the unification of mankind is ever to be realised, it will be necessary to find ways of circumventing our largely unconscious primitive ferocity, partly by establishing a reign of law, and partly by finding innocent outlets for our competitive instincts.

This is not an easy problem, and it is one which cannot be solved by morality alone.

People who live a life which is unnatural beyond a point are likely to be filled with envy, malice and all uncharitableness. They may develop strains of cruelty, or, on the other hand, they may so completely lose all joy of life that they have no longer any capacity for effort.

Anyone who hopes that in time it may be possible to abolish war should give serious thought to the problem of satisfying harmlessly the instincts that we inherit from long generations of savages.

I do not think that ordinary human beings can be happy without competition, for competition has been, ever since the origin of man, the spur to most serious activities. We should not, therefore, attempt to abolish competition, but only to see to it that it takes forms which are not too injurious.

Many people are happier during a war than they are in peace time, provided the direct suffering entailed by the fighting does not fall too heavily upon them personally.

The problem of making peace with our anarchic impulses is one which has been too little studied, but one which becomes more and more imperative as scientific technique advances.

I think perhaps the essence of the matter was given by the Red Indian whom I quoted a moment ago, who regretted the old life because 'there was glory in it'. Every energetic person wants something that can count as 'glory '. There are those who get it-film stars, famous athletes, military commanders, and even some few politicians but they are a small minority, and the rest are left to day-dreams: day-dreams of the cinema, day-dreams of wild west adventure stories, purely private day-dreams of imaginary power.

Greek cities differed greatly as regards the degree of individual liberty permitted to citizens; in most of them there was a great deal, but n Sparta an absolute minimum.

The problem, like all those with which we are concerned, is one of balance; too little liberty brings stagnation and too much brings chaos.

I cannot think of anything that mankind has gained by the existence of Jenghis Khan. I do not know what good came of Robespierre, and, for my part, I see no reason to be grateful to Lenin.

Individual Initiative Reduced to a Minimum And this applies not only to men of rare and exceptional greatness, but to a wide range of talent. In the ages in which there were great poets, there were also large numbers of little poets, and when there were great painters there were large numbers of little painters.

A healthy and progressive society requires both central control and individual and group initiative: without control there is anarchy, and without initiative there is stagnation.

In our complex world there cannot be fruitful initiative without government, but unfortunately there can be government without initiative.

Material goods are more a matter of possession than goods that are mental. A man who eats a piece of food prevents everyone else from eating it, but a man who writes or enjoys a poem does not prevent another man from writing or enjoying one just as good or better. That is why, in regard to material goods, justice is important, but in regard so mental goods the thing that is needed is opportunity and an environment that makes hope of achievement seem rational.

If a man seriously desires to live the best life that is open to him, he must learn to be critical of the tribal customs and tribal beliefs that are generally accepted among his neighbours.

But a society does not, or at least should not, exist to satisfy an external survey, but to bring a good life to the individuals who compose it. It is in the individuals, not in the whole, that ultimate value is to be sought. A good society is a means to a good life for those who compose it, not something having a separate kind of excellence on its own account.

There is another ethical theory, which to my mind is also inadequate; it is that which might be called the 'biological' theory, though I should not wish to assert that it is held by most biologists. This view is derived from a contemplation of evolution. The struggle for existence is supposed to have led gradually to more and more complex organisms, culminating (so far) in man. In this view, survival is the supreme end, or rather, survival of one's own species. Whatever increases the human population of the globe, if this theory is right, is to count as 'good', and whatever, diminishes the population is to count as ' bad'. I cannot see any justification for such a mechanical and arithmetical outlook. It would be easy to find a single acre containing more ants than there arc human beings in the whole world, but we do not on that account acknowledge the superior excellence of ants. And what humane person would prefer a large population living in poverty and squalor to a smaller population living happily with a sufficiency of comfort?

Men in control of vast organisations have tended to be too abstract in their outlook, to forget what actual human beings are like, and to try to fit men to systems rather than systems to men. The lack of spontaneity from which our highly organised societies tend to suffer is connected with excessive control over large areas by remote authorities.

I wish to repeat, with all possible emphasis, that I disagree completely with those who infer from our combative impulses that human nature demands war and other destructive forms of conflict. I firmly believe the very opposite of this. I maintain that combative impulses have an essential part to play, and Ic their harmful forms can be enormously lessened. Greed of possession will grow less when there is no fear of destitution. Love of power can be satisfied in many ways that involve no injury to others: by the power over nature that results from discovery and invention, by the production of admired books or works of art, and by successful persuasion. Energy and the wish to be effective are beneficent if they can find the right outlet, and harmful if not'like steam, which can either drive the train or burst the boiler.

We shall not create a good world by trying to make men tame and timid, but by encouraging them to be bold and adventurous and fearless, except in inflicting injuries upon their fellowmen.

Our present predicament is due more than anything else to the fact that we have learnt to understand and control to a terrifying extent the forces of nature outside us, but not those that are embodied in ourselves.

Self-control has always been a watchword of the moralist, but in the past it has been a control without understanding.