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Preface | x | |
Introduction and Acknowledgments | xxi | |
Chapter 1 | The Columbia Accident | 1 |
Forecast | 1 | |
The Mystery | 4 | |
Debris Rains on Nacogdoches, Texas | 7 | |
The Internet | 9 | |
The President Speaks | 10 | |
A NASA News Conference | 10 | |
Houston, Texas, Loses Heroes | 11 | |
Reactions at the Cape | 12 | |
The Crew and Its Mission | 14 | |
Possible Causes of the Disaster | 17 | |
Chapter 2 | The Week Following: Debris, Data, and Fault Trees | 19 |
Monday, February 3, 2003 | 20 | |
Tuesday, February 4, 2003 | 26 | |
Wednesday, February 5, 2003 | 32 | |
Thursday, February 6, 2003 | 34 | |
Friday, February 7, 2003 | 38 | |
Saturday, February 8, 2003 | 41 | |
Chapter 3 | Culture and Communication in NASA | 47 |
Redding's Ideal Managerial Climate | 48 | |
NASA's Culture and Climate | 51 | |
Research and Testing | 57 | |
In-House Technical Capability | 58 | |
Hands-On Experience | 59 | |
Exceptional People | 61 | |
Risk and Failure | 62 | |
Frontier Mentality | 64 | |
Chapter 4 | Communication and Culture in the Marshall Space Flight Center | 67 |
A Research Opportunity at MSFC | 67 | |
The Arsenal Concept | 70 | |
Organizational Structure at MSFC: Mitosis | 71 | |
Project Management | 72 | |
Formal Versus Informal Organization | 74 | |
Upward Communication as an Earthquake Prediction System | 78 | |
Shepherd's Three Problems | 79 | |
The Mushroom Problem | 81 | |
The Monday Notes | 82 | |
Monday Notes as Organizational Learning | 85 | |
Automatic Responsibility | 87 | |
Penetration | 88 | |
A Briefing for Shepherd | 90 | |
The Saturn V Control Center Problem | 90 | |
Briefings and Weekly Notes for Headquarters | 92 | |
Briefing for von Braun | 93 | |
Staff and Board Briefing | 95 | |
Saturn V Flies | 96 | |
Return to MSFC | 96 | |
Cultural Categories | 99 | |
Research and Testing | 99 | |
In-House Technical Capability | 99 | |
Hands-On Experience | 100 | |
Exceptional People | 101 | |
Risk and Failure | 101 | |
Frontier Mentality | 101 | |
Open Communication | 102 | |
Topoi and Tradeoffs | 104 | |
Organizational Identification | 105 | |
Unobtrusive Control | 107 | |
Chapter 5 | The Challenger Accident | 111 |
Claus Jensen and No Downlink | 119 | |
Feynman's Two Experiments | 119 | |
The 'Challenger Syndrome' | 121 | |
Diane Vaughan and The Challenger Launch Decision | 122 | |
A Faustian Bargain | 124 | |
Chapter 6 | The Mysteries of Columbia Continue | 129 |
The Avuncular Anchor | 130 | |
A Changed Culture? | 134 | |
E-Mail Excerpts | 138 | |
O'Keefe Gets Grilled | 141 | |
Ron Dittemore and Others Are Reassigned | 142 | |
CAIB Adds Three New Members to Inquiry | 143 | |
Groupthink? | 144 | |
CAIB Hearing and a Double Meaning | 147 | |
Two More Deaths | 147 | |
Bordering on the Irresponsible? | 149 | |
A Little Bit of an Echo | 150 | |
To Scapegoat or Not | 151 | |
Rescue Try 'Conceivable' | 156 | |
The Wisdom of Yogi Berra | 156 | |
Linda Ham Meets the Press | 159 | |
Chapter 7 | Reading the CAIB Report: Echoes of Challenger and a Cultural Fence | 163 |
Fault Tree Analysis | 164 | |
1. | Solid Rocket Booster Bolt Catchers | 164 |
2. | Kapton Wiring | 165 |
3. | Hypergolic Fuel Spill | 165 |
4. | Space Weather | 165 |
5. | Asymmetric Boundary Layer Transition | 165 |
6. | Training and On-Orbit Performance | 166 |
7. | Payloads | 166 |
8. | Willful Damage and Security | 166 |
9. | Micrometeoroids and Orbital Debris Risks | 166 |
10. | Foreign Object Damage Prevention | 166 |
The Mystery of NASA's Culture | 169 | |
Testing Feynman's Hypothesis | 171 | |
Other Communication Problems | 174 | |
Organizational Causes | 175 | |
Fasterbettercheaper | 176 | |
The Safety Culture | 179 | |
Chapter 8 of the CAIB Report | 180 | |
8.1 | Echoes of Challenger | 180 |
8.2 | Failures of Foresight: Two Decision Histories and the Normalization of Deviance | 181 |
8.3 | System Effects: The Impact of History and Politics on Risky Work | 181 |
8.4 | Organization, Culture, and Unintended Consequences | 182 |
8.5 | History as Cause: Two Accidents | 182 |
8.6 | Changing NASA's Organizational System | 184 |
The Two Cultures Argument | 185 | |
1. | Research and Testing | 187 |
2. | In-house Technical Capability | 187 |
3. | Hands-on Experience | 188 |
4. | Exceptional People | 188 |
5. | Risk and Failure | 188 |
6. | Open Communication | 189 |
7. | Organizational Identification and Control | 190 |
A Footnote on Control | 190 | |
Recommendations | 195 | |
1. | Near-Term: Return to Flight | 195 |
2. | Mid-Term: Continuing to Fly | 195 |
3. | Long-Term: Future Direction for the United States in Space | 196 |
Chapter 8 | The Challenger Syndrome and the Decline of American Organizations and Institutions: 'Speaking Truth to Power' | 201 |
'Wal-Mart Effect' | 212 | |
The Golden Rule | 220 | |
Notes to Chapter Eight | 230 | |
Chapter 9 | Chicken Little, the Ostrich, and Spiderman | 233 |
The CAIB Report and the Press | 233 | |
An Insider's View | 236 | |
Chicken Little and the Ostrich | 238 | |
The Meaning of the Situation as Influencing Behavior | 245 | |
Ideal Managerial Climate | 246 | |
To Scapegoat or Not | 247 | |
The Two-Cultures Hypothesis | 249 | |
The Historical Perspective | 250 | |
Final Recommendation | 253 | |
Ontological Anxiety | 254 | |
Coda | 256 | |
Cast of Characters | 261 | |
Managers at Time of Crash of Columbia | 261 | |
Columbia Astronauts (as given in CAIB) | 261 | |
Debris Search Pilots (Killed in Action) | 261 | |
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) | 261 | |
Glossary of Acronyms and Technical Terms | 263 | |
References | 271 | |
Name Index | 275 | |
Subject Index | 281 |
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