Iran, Islam and Democracy: The Politics of Managing Change Book

As a journalist with a deep interest in Afghanistan, Gretchen Peters offers an extensively researched account of the evolution of the heroin trade within Afghanistan and Pakistan. The recent escalation of hostilities in the region and the resurgence of the Taliban can be directly attributed to the proliferation of poppy fields. Furthermore, Afghanistan can now be described as a narco-state that parallels the development of the FARC within Colombia more closely than the insurgency in Iraq. From personally meeting many of the major players within the opium trade to relentlessly obtaining access to confidential intelligence cables and documents, Peters has gone to great lengths to provide a substantiated narrative of the Afghanistan heroin trade.

Response:

While Peters has extensively researched the connections between the Afghanistan insurgency, the numerous regional actors, and the poppy trade, the book suffers from a lack of broader context. Little discussion is given to the flows of opium once it exits the region beyond a brief mention of Europe being the primary recipient. Without a complete understanding of the opium markets that Afghanistan fuels, policy solutions will suffer as opium markets adapt to one-sided efforts.

This book is very much a journalistic account of the topic and suffers from a lack of theory. Peters largely neglects theoretical discussion of counterinsurgencies or counternarcotics operations. Many of Peters' conclusions coincide with counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine and could have greatly benefited from incorporating principles of COIN within her work, giving it a more substantial theoretical basis. The U.S. Army/Marine Counterinsurgency Field Manual is excellent supplemental reading for anyone engaged with these issues.

Several important topics could have used far more discussion and depth. For example, Peters quickly dismisses the initial strategy for the Afghanistan invasion as inadequate "with predictably unfortunately results. (105)" Since the awareness of COIN doctrine has been a relatively recent phenomena (the U.S. Army/Marine Counterinsurgency Field Manual was published in 2006), initial operations within Afghanistan may have suffered from a lack of theoretical understanding of the nature of the conflict instead of blatant strategic errors. For Peters to claim that the current situation in Afghanistan was predictable from the start, far more depth is needed.

Peters's discussion of Iran is also cursory. Even though Peters does document several instances of Iranian involvement, Peters avoids exploring whether or not this involvement is the result of official Iranian policy or the result of a few Iranian actors searching for profit.

In contrast, the connections between Afghanistan and Pakistan, particularly the ISI, are discussed extensively.

Bottom Line:

A pivotal book for understanding Afghanistan. Those interested in illicit networks, the intricacies of the Afghanistan insurgency, or the complexities of the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship will also find this book fascinating. The book is also easily accessible for readers without a background on these topics.

For more reviews and a summary of Peters' main points, find us at Hand of Reason.