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_Mutiny: A History of Naval Insurrection_ by Leonard F. Guttridge is a thorough account of mutinies from the days of Magellan to the present, examining the concept, causes, and solutions to mutiny as well as looking in detail at a number of examples throughout history.

Surprisingly, defining just what a mutiny is has been the subject of some debate, as different people at different times around the world have not agreed on just what constitutes mutiny. Whether they were writers of naval codes and regulations, judges presiding over a mutiny-related court martial, or a captain on a ship confronted with it, people have been in relatively little agreement on what exactly should be considered mutinous behavior, often changing the definition of mutiny from case to case of "collective insubordination" (one of the many euphemisms used instead of mutiny, a word avoided by many as it carries "its own exclamation;" other euphemisms have included "combat refusal," "disciplinary problem," and "demonstration of grievance").

So what is mutiny? Is it merely refusal to obey a superior officer? Does mutiny require a large number of men, merely two or more, or can one individual be guilty of mutinous behavior? Should mutiny be more narrowly defined as a "conspiratorial determination to overthrow authority and seize control" of a ship? Must there violence to warrant the use of the term mutiny; can there be a passive mutiny, such as a sit-down strike? Should mere talk of mutiny be treated the same as actual mutinous physical activity? Can mere disrespect (rather than outright disobedience) be considered mutinous, such as perhaps unflattering gossip, satirical cartoons circulated below decks, or even ugly glances at officers?

There has also been debate over who gets to declare a mutiny is occurring over the centuries. Most might think that it would be the ship's captain or an admiral with the fleet, but many have felt it necessary that either other impartial witnesses must testify to the fact or instead believed it better that any alleged mutineers merely be detained and whether they were guilty of mutiny or not (and their punishment, if any) to be decided upon by a court martial back in port.

Of course, particularly in the age of sail, when a vessel might be gone for months or even years and there were no rapid means of communication, locking up mutineers and especially waiting to decide whether or not a mutiny occurred and what punishment to inflict was highly impractical. During the days when many sailors were forced to work thanks to the efforts of press gangs, the gulf of class differences between officers and the lower decks was huge, and living conditions onboard could be quite bad, swift action in the face of mutiny was vital.

What action might that be though? Throughout much of history death was the automatic punishment, but this was not always deemed practical, such as on small ships far from home, where every member of a crew was needed and replacements were not to be had, when hundreds or even thousands of sailors were disobedient, or when political opinion at home tended to be sympathetic. If punishment was not to be the death sentence, then what should it be? Also, must every act of disobedience be dealt with harshly or even punished at all? Authorities were often sharply divided over whether light sentences were a good thing or not and even more over the notion that on some occasions the sailors might have legitimate grievances and that the authorities might bargain with them or even grant their demands. Some naval authorities were adamantly opposed to this, not even wanting to acknowledge the fact that any sailor could be spoken to as a representative and that any type of bargaining would erode naval authority and provoke calls for yet more demands, while other authorities were equally convinced that it was only wise and prudent to allow for some outlet for grievances and that it vital to maintain ship and fleet morale. In many cases a lack of agreement on how to handle mutinies (as well as a complete lack of awareness of the feelings of the lower decks) either provoked mutinies or allowed them to become much worse.

The reasons for mutiny over the centuries have varied a great deal. Some mutinies were the reaction of war-weary and homesick sailors, reacting to overextended deployments or being sent to theaters of war they felt they had no business going to, such as with two British mutinies, one against intervention in Russia in 1919 and another in 1944 on the over-crowed cargo ship _HMS Lothian_, its crew reacting to a deployment from the British Isles to the South Pacific. Other mutinies were done for patriotic reasons, such as the mutiny of the Greek destroyer _Velos_ in 1973, its officers working against the military junta that had overthrown King Constantine XIII in 1967 and that of the Soviet missile frigate _Storozhevoy_ in 1975, whose ringleader, a zampolit or political officer no less, wanted to protest Soviet hypocrisies and demand reform. Similarly, still other mutineers hoped to inspire revolutions; Brazil's sole two battleships, _Minas Geraes_ and Sao Paulo_, were led by rebellious officers who hoped to lead a revolution in 1924, while the crew of the famed Russian battleship _Potemkin_ hoped to spark a revolution in 1905. Racial tensions lead to mutiny of one sort or another in 1972 on the American carriers _Kitty Hawk_ and _Constellation_.

Most mutinies, mainly those in the age of sail at least, were due to poor working conditions, pay cuts (or lack of pay), and/or "tyrannical or neurotic officers." Well detailed in the book are the famous mutiny on the _HMS Bounty_, the mass Spithead and Nore mutinies of 1797, the bloody and violent 1797 mutiny on the frigate _HMS Hermione_ in the Caribbean, the mutiny on the American training brig-of-war _Somers_ in 1842, and the series of mutinies in the early 1930s in the Chilean, British, and Dutch navies.