Reference and Essence Book

	Preface to the First Edition	xiii
	Preface to the Expanded Edition	xvii
	Introduction	3
I	The Theory of Direct Reference
1	The Theory of Singular Direct Reference
1	A Formulation of the Theory	9
1.1	The Orthodox Notion of Sense
1.2	Descriptional Singular Terms
1.3	Relationally Descriptional Singular Terms
1.4	Orthodox Theories and the Theory of Direct Reference
2	The Arguments	23
2.1	The Modal Arguments
2.2	The Epistemological Arguments
2.3	The Semantical Arguments
2.4	Contextual Factors in Reference
3	Rigid Designators	32
3.1	Two Kinds of Rigid Designators: Persistence and Obstinacy
3.2	Proper Names, Nondescriptionality, and Obstinacy
3.3	A Criterion for Obstinacy
2	The Theory Extended to General Terms
4	A Reformulation of the Theory	42
4.1	Descriptional General Terms
4.2	Common Nouns as Proper Names
4.3	A Point of Disanalogy
4.4	Designation
4.5	Relationally Descriptional Designators
4.6	Orthodox Theories and the Theory of Direct Reference
4.7	The Traditional Theory of Cognition and Understanding
5	The Arguments Reconsidered	59
5.1	The General Form of the Arguments
5.2	An Obvious Objection
5.3	A Reply: Putnam's Twin Earth Argument
6	Rigid Designators Reconsidered	69
6.1	General Term Designation and Rigid Designation
6.2	A Criterion for General Term Designation
3	Reference and the Necessary A Posteriori
7	Some Consequences of the Theory	76
7.1	Traditional Assimilations
7.2	Necessary A Posteriori Identities
7.3	The General Phenomenon
8	Other Alleged Necessary A Posteriori Truths	80
8.1	The Examples
8.2	Trivial Essentialism
8.3	Nontrivial Essentialism Concerning Natural Kinds
8.4	Nontrivial Essentialism Concerning Individuals
9	A Crucial Question	87
4	Putnam's Theory of Natural Kind Terms
10	Putnam's Theses	93
11	Initial Exegetical Remarks	99
11.1	The 'is' of Instantiation
11.2	A Gross Misinterpretation
11.3	A Subtle Misinterpretation
11.4	A Difficulty in Interpretation
12	First Formulations	106
12.1	An Initial Formalization
12.2	Time-Slices and Possible World-Slices of Continuant Individuals
12.3	An Initial Attempt to Eliminate Possible World-Slices
13	Cross-World Relations	116
13.1	Cross-World Construal of Binary Relations
13.2	Intra-World Attributes, Extra-World Attributes, and Cross-World Relations
13.3	A Mechanism for Generating Cross-World Relations
13.4	Nondenoting Singular Terms
14	Reformulations	136
14.1	A New Attempt at Formalization
14.2	Thesis (T3)
14.3	Reductionism and Analysis
14.4	Translation into Modal Operator Discourse
15	Further Exegetical Remarks	148
15.1	Theses (T5) and (T6)
15.2	Thesis (T4)
15.3	Thesis (T7)
15.4	Thesis (T6) Again
II	The Program to Derive Essentialism from the Theory of Reference
5	The K and I Mechanisms
16	Putnam on (T9)	161
17	Donnellan's Elucidations of (T9)	163
18	The OK-Mechanism	166
18.1	A Valid Modal Argument
18.2	The General Case
19	The General K-Mechanism and the I-Mechanism	169
19.1	The General K-Mechanism
19.2	The I-Mechanism
20	The Program	174
6	Hidden Essentialism in the K and I Mechanisms
21	The First Two Premises	176
22	The Third Premise	176
22.1	Putnam and Donnellan on the Third Premise
22.2	Formalization
22.3	The K-Mechanisms
22.4	The I-Mechanism
23	The Failure of the Program	183
23.1	The Original Argument
23.2	The K and I Mechanisms
7	Arguments for the Essentiality of Origin
24	Kripke and the Putnam Program	193
25	Kripke's "Proof" of the Essentiality of Origin	196
25.1	Kripke's Formulation of Argument
25.2	Some Initial Considerations
25.3	The Compossibility Premise
25.4	The Unfinished Argument
25.5	A Principle of Cross-World Identification
25.6	An Alternative Argument
26	Compossibility Principles and Cross-World Identification Principles	214
	Conclusion	217
Appendix I	Principles of Cross-World Identification
27	Cross-World Identification Principles and the Ship of Theseus	219
27.1	An Argument for Contingent Identity
27.2	A Fallacy
27.3	A Better Theory
28	The Four Worlds Paradox	229
28.1	The Argument
28.2	One Solution
28.3	A Better Solution
28.4	Vagueness and the Paradox
Appendix II	The Essentialist Principles in the K and I Mechanisms
29	Donnellan vs. Kripke	253
30	A Problem in the Epistemology of Modality	253
31	The Nonmodal Consequences	255
32	Connecting Statements	260
32.1	The Need for Connecting Statements
32.2	The Theoretical Status of the Connecting Statements
33	Conclusion	264
Appendix III	Fregean Theory and the Four Worlds Paradox
34	Fregean Theory	265
35	The Four Worlds Paradox	268
Appendix IV	Modal Paradox: Parts and Counterparts, Points and Counterpoints
36	Modal Paradox	273
37	A Modal Fallacy	282
38	Counterpart Theory	286
39	Modal Paradox and Sorites	298
40	Some Shortcomings of Counterpart Theory	302
41	More Shortcomings of Counterpart Theory	312
42	The Solution Refined	321
43	Vagueness and Modal Paradox	326
44	Twin Worlds	331
45	Necessity and Apriority	335
46	The Determinacy of Identity	338
Appendix V	Cross-World Identification and Stipulation
47	Haecceitism, Reductionism, and the Problem of Cross-World Identification	345
48	A Residual Problem of Cross-World Identification	356
49	A Third Problem of Cross-World Identification	362
Appendix VI	Letter to Teresa Robertson
50	If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It	369
51	If It Is, Do	371
Appendix VII	Naming, Necessity, and Beyond
52	Substitution	377
53	Are General Terms Rigid?	382
54	The Necessity of Water Being H[subscript 2]O	393
	Select Bibliography	399
	Index of Labeled Expressions of Parts I and II	419
	Index of Subjects of Parts I and II	425