African Guerrillas: Raging Against the Machine Book

In this book, Geoffrey Blainey conducts a remarkably thorough investigation into the specific causes of war and offers several interesting conclusions. Blainey complains that different schools of academia often investigate the causes of war with a specific angle or hypothesis in mind and that due to this subjective viewpoint, frequently find conclusions that agree exactly with their predictions. In order to fully comprehend the causes of war, Blainey states, one must also examine the causes of peace. War and peace are not two separate phenomenon, but rather two parts of an ongoing cycle. While one says, "A war broke out," one doesn't say, "peace broke out," yet the reasons behind war ceasing and peace breaking out appear to be a reversal of the reasons that peace ceases and war breaks out.

Blainey calls up the work of many previous military analysts including Clausewitz, Macfie, and Henry Thomas Buckle. He puts their findings and theories to the test by analyzing all major international wars since 1700, picking out historical examples, and searching for trends and patterns. Each chapter examines a specific theory, such as the idea that capitalism and economic ties between countries decrease the likelihood of war. He also looks at the theory of scapegoat wars, war as an accident, "surprise" attacks that allegedly begin wars, and more. However, I found his most insightful finding to be that war commences when nations have 'contradictory optimism' about the probable outcome of the war. In other words, a decision to go to war only occurs when the decision makers believe that there is more to be gained from war than from peace. As Blainey says "War itself then provides the stinging ice of reality. At the end of a war those rival expectations, initially so far apart, are so close to one another that terms of peace can be agreed upon." I am curious to know what his opinion would be of the popular neoconservative theory that democracies will not go to war with one another.

At the end of the book, Blainey offers a list of conclusions, which nicely summarize his findings. Some of the more interesting among these are:
"The idea that one nation can be blamed for causing a war is as erroneous as the idea that one nation can be mainly praised for causing the end of the war. Most current explanations of war, however, rest on these errors."
"A formula for measuring international power is essential: ironically the most useful formula is warfare. Until the function of warfare is appreciated, the search for a more humane and more efficient way of measuring power is likely to be haphazard."
"It is doubtful whether any war since 1700 was begun with the belief, by both sides, that it would be a long war."
"No wars are unintended or 'accidental'. What is often unintended is the length and bloodiness of the war. Defeat too is unintended."

I could quote them all, but that would give away too much without an understanding of the rigorous analysis Blainey applies in order to come up with these conclusions. I highly recommend this book to all who are curious about peace & conflict resolution, military history, and world history.