Divine Wind: Japan's Kamikaze Force in World War II Book

This 1958 book by former Japanese naval officers associated with the formation and deployment of the Special Attack groups known as Kamikazes provides fascinating insights into the program, the leaders and aviators involved. Is it crazy to choose a suicidal mission or is it courageous? Rational or irrational? It was often a matter of perspective and circumstance.

For the first Kamikazes stationed in the Philippines, the authors paint a picture of naval aviators readily volunteering for the crash bombing assignments and doing so for logical reasons. At this stage of the war, the Japanese were overmatched in every way: the Americans had more pilots, more aircraft and better performing aircraft than the Japanese. The problem of the moment was to suppress American carrier aviation to allow for the possibility of success for Operation Sho-Go, which resulted in what we now call the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

The choice was between conventional attacks that were likely suicidal and rarely successful or crash bombing attacks that were definitely suicidal, but much more likely to be successful. The veteran pilots lined up to be given the opportunity to take a shot at one of the American carriers and thus potentially save the lives of their countrymen in the upcoming naval engagement.

The tactics were carefully developed using constant feedback from spotter aircraft assigned to missions. This involved fighter escorts, radar evasion, several approach tactics, optimal angle of attack, etc. The training for selected pilots was rigorous and peak physical condition was assured: good diet, no alcohol prior to missions, etc. The results were much more successful than traditional attacks during this period.

In contrast to these early efforts that may have had an outside chance of success by some measurements, the continuation of the program by Japan's military elite is much more difficult to justify, other than to say that it wasn't much worse than other fight-to-the-death tactics employed. The pilots involved at this stage were also not veteran flyers making the best of a nearly hopeless situation, but rather brainwashed lambs led to a futile slaughter.

Though Japanese claims exaggerated the number of ships sunk when compared to post-war analysis, they actually under reported the total number of ships damaged. The final tally of the Kamikaze campaign:

Japan: 1228 pilots and aircraft destroyed (including escorts)

Allies: 34 ships sunk and 288 ships damaged (Japanese claim of 81 sunk and 195 damaged)

The early phases of the book are very compelling and involve first-hand accounts of the authors' involvement with operations in the Philippines and Formosa. I would call this the 5 star part of the book.

The remainder of the book qualifies for 3 stars. It includes a brief overview of the Kamikaze actions throughout the rest of the war with a majority occurring during the Okinawa campaign, the final demise of Kamikaze proponents Admirals Onishi and Ugaki, a summary of academic opinions critical to the Kamikaze program, and finally a collection of the last letters of Kamikaze pilot to their families. These final sections seem shallow and superficial in comparison to the rich content presented in the first half of book.