Russia's Oil Barons And Metal Magnates Book

List of Tables     ix
Preface     xi
Introduction     1
A comparative historical perspective     2
Historical overview of the Russian oligarchs     8
Enemies of all     9
Western investors     17
Review of the evidence     18
Who are the Barons and Magnates?     21
The samples     21
The possibilities     24
The 'Gang of Seven'     25
The 'new oligarchs'     30
Conclusions     35
How Did They Get Rich?     40
The financial sector     41
Privatization     43
Spontaneous privatization     44
Mass privatization     45
Corporate governance     52
Shares-for-credit     54
The second peredel     60
Use of the courts, civil and criminal     65
The use of criminal 'authorities'     67
Corporate governance 'enlightenment'     71
Socially responsible business     73
Conclusions     75
The Economic Performance of the Barons and Magnates     77
Are oligarch companies worse off than they were before?     81
Norilsk Nickel     86
Apatit     87
North Urals Bauxite Mine (SUBR)     88
Yukos     89
Extraction of excessive returns     92
Investment     93
Conclusions     98
Oligarchy and Political Power     99
1991-95     100
1996-98     101
1998-2000     107
2000-03     108
Taxation in the Resource Sector     112
Tax in the mid-1990s     112
Tax in the late 1990s and beyond     117
The Yukos Affair     121
The arrest of Lebedov     121
The arrest of Khodorkovsky     123
The threat to Yukos     126
The sale of Yuganskneftegaz     130
What was it all about?     136
The Aftermath of Yukos     149
The Yukos effect: good or bad?     149
Investment and growth     152
Increased tax burden     155
Was justice done?     157
New concepts in tax law     163
Yukos, tax and democracy     168
Conclusion     173
Notes     180
Bibliography     220
Index      226