Data Reconciliation And Gross Error Detection Book

A comprehensive military history of chemical weapons from their root in WWI through 2006, War of Nerves does a fantastic job of illustrating how organizational imperatives and domestic politics play just as strong of role in weapon development programs as does defined military need or strategic imperatives. Tucker is by no means polemical, but he does convey that the meta-argument over deterrence often had little connection at best to military requirements, preparedness, and technical constraints.

However, he also illustrates how close several states were to CW deployment as part of a broad conventional campaign, most strikingly Nazi Germany in 1945, combatant Arab states during the 1973 war with Israel, and Iraq in 1991. Tucker argues that in each case awareness of asymmetrical capabilities (especially inability to protect their own populations from retaliation) prevented otherwise logical CW use for military purposes. If you accept that argument (which Tucker does not flesh out with much sourcing or research of his own) then he does an insufficient job of pivoting in the last chapter in support of the CWC and the existence of norms as the best tool to prevent future CW use. I'm not taking a position on either side, but rather noting Tucker's meticulous evidence itself undermines what appear in the last chapter to be his policy preferences.

This is a highly relevant book to frame the pervasive use of chemical weapons in Syria today as the international community stands by, unable or unwilling to enforce the norm. It is reminiscent of the Italian use of CW against Abyssinia as the League of Nations wrung its hands, a historical analogy that should deeply worry anyone concerned over the stability of today's international system.