Federalism, Liberty, and the Law Book

Foreword xi 1.The Analytics of Federalism Federalism and Fiscal Equity 3
An Efficiency Basis for Federal Fiscal Equalization (James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner) 23
Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility: An Assessment of the Tiebout Model (James M. Buchanan and Charles J. Goetz) 44 2.Federalism and Freedom Federalism as an Ideal Political Order and an Objective for Constitutional Reform 67
Federalism and Individual Sovereignty 79
Economic Freedom and Federalism: Prospects for the New Century 90
Europe ’Constitutional Opportunity 99
National Politics and Competitive Federalism: Italy and the Constitution of Europe 118
On a Fiscal Constitution for the European Union (James M. Buchanan and Dwight R. Lee) 131
Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Toward a Theory of Internal Exit (James M. Buchanan and Roger L. Faith) 148 3.Liberty, Man, and the State Man and the State 167
Criteria for a Free Society: Definition, Diagnosis, and Prescription 173
The Individual as Participant in Political Exchange 185
Towards the Simple Economics of Natural Liberty: An Exploratory Analysis 198
Property as a Guarantor of Liberty 216 4.The Constitution of Markets On the Structure of an Economy: A Re-emphasis of Some Classical Foundations 263
Market Failure and Political Failure 276
The Market as a Creative Process (James M. Buchanan and Viktor J. Vanberg) 289
Cultural Evolution and Institutional Reform 311 5.Economists, Efficiency, and the Law Good Economics —Bad Law 327
Comment 338
Politics, Property, and the Law: An Alternative Interpretation of Miller et al. v. Schoene 342
In Defense of Caveat Emptor 358
Notes on Irrelevant Externalities, Enforcement Costs and the Atrophy of Property Rights 369 6.Law, Money, and Crime Gold, Money and the Law: The Limits of Governmental Monetary Authority (James M. Buchanan and T. Nicolaus Tideman) 385
A Defense of Organized Crime? 432 Name Index 449 Subject Index 453