Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views Book

This book covers some of the hot topics that arise from thinking about God's foreknowledge. For instance, does God know the future free actions of human agents? If he does not, does that mean he is not omniscient? But what if it was logically inconsistent to claim that an indeterminate event could be known in advance, for there is nothing that grounds the truth of said event; moreover, infallible foreknowledge (or belief, which is entailed by knowing some proposition, p) would seem to "settle" the matter, thus removing any alternative possibilities to do otherwise and therefore falsify the knowledge, which is impossible (roughly: if some proposition, p, is known, then p is true, thus if it is true that a subject S knows that p, then p cannot be false, S cannot be mistaken). On this analysis, someone could claim that God is omniscient but doesn't know the future free actions of human beings since it is impossible to know such things, as they have no truth-value.

But if God does foreknow the future free actions of human beings, which is what the classical view of omniscience maintains, does this somehow rule out freedom? Well, it may rule out libertarian freedom (roughly: the view that freedom is incompatible with determinism, and we are indeed free (this qualification is required since some believe that the two are incompatible and we are not free, so they are not libertarians), but a compatibilistic freedom is still in play (roughly: compatibilism is the view that there is a freedom that is compatible with the free act being determined in some way).

In response to this, some object that compatibilist freedom is not enough to ground ascriptions of moral praise and/or blame to a human agent. Since the Bible clearly teaches we are morally responsible, then we need to look elsewhere other than compatibilism.

But besides all of this is the question of how God knows the future, especially the future free actions of some of his creation. Does he know it because he planned it? Does he know it because he is timelessly viewing everything at one (like you would view an entire parade from a distance, seeing the beginning, middle, and end all at the same time)? Does he know it because he knows all of the counterfactuals of human freedom, and so what he human would freely do in any circumstance? These are some of the issues broached in this book styled after the "n views" format, where each author present their case and the other authors have a chance to respond.

In this book there are four views (hence the four in the title!) on divine foreknowledge. There is the Open Theist view (the view that God does not know the future free actions of libertarianly free human agents) presented and defended by Greg Boyd. There is the simple foreknowledge view (God foreknows, this removes alternative possibilities, yet man has libertarian freedom) presented and defended by Dave Hunt. There is the middle knowledge view (God foreknows all the counterfactuals of freedom, i.e., what any given human would do in any given circumstance). And there is the Augustinian/Calvinist view (God foreknows all the future free actions of human beings by consulting his decree) presented and defended by Paul Helm.

Hunt's is probably the most interesting since he is a minority (I don't know what his ethnicity is, I just mean he holds a minority position). He holds that God foreknows future free actions, that this removes alternative possibilities, but we still have libertarian freedom. He says since these things are so sure arguments that seek to undermine one or both of the Scriptural desiderata cannot be correct, and we only need wait to spot the fallacy (he likens it to Zeno's paradoxes about motion, claiming we know motion is real and Achilles will overtake the tortoise, so there has to be a problem with Zeno's argument, even if we can't pin point it. He therefore goes against the libertarian grain by denying PAP (principle of alternative possibilities). He also critiques all the major arguments that libertarians have used to try and show how foreknowledge and freedom are compatible. So he is helpful in this respect, for a Calvinist like myself.

Boyd is also helpful since he critiques libertarian attempts to reconcile freedom and foreknowledge. Many have claimed that Open Theism is the logical implication of Arminianism. If Boyd's arguments are correct, that is the case. However, I thought Boyd arguments were the weakest of the bunch.

William Lane Craig's essay was, of course, well done. He defends Molinism. This view claims to let us have our cake and eat it too. Man is still libertarianly free, and meticulous providence can be maintained since God instantiated the world where all the creatures freely did just what would bring about his plan. He offers some critiques of the other views, but I don't think they work. Another problem is that I just don't see how his view isn't a form of determinism. And, of course, the "grounding objection" was brought up. Craig addressed one version of that objection in his essay, but Hunt raised his hand and said um. Well, he said more than that, he said that there were better versions of the grounding objection, like this one . . . (read the book, no spoilers here!).

Paul Helm presented and defended the position I hold to. I thought he did a good job. Good, not great. He makes a distinction between positive and negative governing to rebut the charges that God decreeing all that comes to pass makes him the author of sin (I just wonder why people think a metaphor stands in for an argument). he also does a good job pointing out that God's interaction with and ordering and governing of his creation is sui generous, so it's not really fair to judge him by the yard stick of determinisms we know about ala physicalism, behaviorism, &c. He also argues that the biblical picture of man's plight is that man is in such a deplorable state that libertarianism just can't get the job done. God must turn the sinner's heart toward himself, and compatibilism best explains this.

Overall this is a good book for those who want to jump head first into the fascinating topic of God's foreknowledge and how it works with people who are supposed to be free. It's a bit dated, but solid enough to whet your appetite for more and send you to the next book or article with enough understanding that you'll be able to fend for yourself in deeper waters (it even includes a glossary of key terms used in this discussion). I don't think Boyd was the best representative for his side. Perhaps a Hasker or a Rhoda would be better. I don't think Helm used the best arguments for his side and against libertarianism. Craig, for all his sophistication, ultimately didn't present a compelling case, left too many unanswered questions, and dealt with a weak version of the main objection to Molinism. Hunt was cool and I wonder why he just doesn't bite the bullet and affirm compatibilism. Ultimately his appeal to Zeno's paradox as a good analogy for why he didn't need to show any reconciliation fell flat. Helm pointed out that the analogy is terribly weak. I don't know if you'll read this book, but God does (apologies to Boyd). If God knows you will, does this mean you've been "fated" to read it? That you can't do anything about it? I guess you'll have to read the book to see how best you want to answer those questions.