Freedom As a Value: A Critique of the Ethical Theory of Jean-Paul Sartre Book

	Acknowledgements	v
	Introduction	1
Chapter 1	Freedom	5
1.1	Introduction	5
1.2	Sartre's Arguments for Freedom	6
1.2.1	The First Argument: Consciousness is Not What it Is	6
1.2.1.1	The Rejection of the Phenomenological Reduction	9
1.2.1.2	The Transcendence of the Ego	16
1.2.1.3	Acts, Roles, Psychic States, and Emotions	22
1.2.2	The Second Argument: Consciousness Is What it is Not	25
1.2.2.1	Imagination	26
1.2.2.2	Doubt	27
1.2.2.3	Destruction	27
1.2.2.4	Interrogation	28
1.2.2.5	Perception	29
1.2.2.6	The Experience of Absence	31
1.3	The Nature of Freedom	35
1.3.1	The Omnipotence Objection	36
1.3.1.1	Limitations to Freedom	39
1.3.1.1.1	Facticity	40
1.3.1.1.2	Coefficient of Adversity	43
1.3.1.1.3	Situation	46
1.3.1.1.4	Human Condition	49
1.3.1.1.5	Practico-Inert	50
1.3.1.1.6	Counter-Finality	52
1.3.1.1.7	My Relations With Others	54
1.3.1.2	The Omnipotence Objection Answered	55
1.3.2	The Inconsistency Objection	56
1.3.2.1	Different Senses of Freedom	57
1.3.2.1.1	Does Sartre Recognize a Need to Distinguish Between Different Senses of Freedom?	58
1.3.2.1.2	Does Sartre in Fact Distinguish Between Different Senses of Freedom?	59
1.3.2.1.3	Are Sartre's Distinctions Between Different Senses of Freedom Relevant?	60
1.3.2.1.4	Ontological Freedom and Practical Freedom	62
1.3.2.1.5	An Objection to Sartre's Ontological Freedom	69
1.3.2.1.6	Some Difficulties with Sartre's Practical Freedom	70
1.3.2.2	The Inconsistency Objection Answered	76
1.3.2.2.1	Desan	80
1.3.2.2.2	Merleau-Ponty	85
1.3.3	The Radical Break Objection	93
1.3.3.1	Sartre's Testimony	93
1.3.3.2	Errors of the Radical Break Theorists	96
1.3.3.3	Radical Conversion	102
1.3.3.4	The Radical Break Objection Answered	131
1.4	Conclusion	131
Chapter 2	Values	133
2.1	Introduction	133
2.2	The Subjectivity of Values and the Subjectivity of Value-Judgments	135
2.2.1	The Compatibility of the Subjectivity of Values and the Objectivity of Value-Judgments	137
2.3	Sartre's Arguments for Ethical Subjectivism	144
2.3.1	The Experience of Values as "Lacks"	144
2.3.1.1	Criticism of the Argument from the Experience of Values as "Lacks"	146
2.3.2	The Distinction Between Facts and Values	148
2.3.2.1	Criticism of the Argument from the Distinction Between Facts and Values	149
2.3.3	The Hierarchy of Projects	150
2.3.3.1	Criticism of the Argument from the Hierarchy of Projects	152
2.3.4	The Nonexistence of God	153
2.3.4.1	Criticism of the Argument from the Nonexistence of God	154
2.3.5	Irresolvable Moral Dilemmas	155
2.3.5.1	Criticism of the Argument from Irresolvable Moral Dilemmas	160
2.4	General Criticisms of Sartre's Ethical Subjectivism	163
2.4.1	The Moral Equivalence of All Free Actions	164
2.4.2	The Authentic Torturer Problem	165
2.4.3	The Groundlessness of the Value of Authenticity	166
2.4.4	The Absurdity of Total Subjectivism	167
2.4.5	The Coefficient of Adversity in Our Value Experience	168
2.4.6	Responsibility	169
2.4.7	Anguish	173
2.4.8	Repentance	174
2.5	Conclusion	176
Chapter 3	Freedom as a Value	177
3.1	Introduction	177
3.2	Sartre's Ethical Objectivism	178
3.2.1	Freedom and Needs	181
3.3	The Problem of Justification	186
3.3.1	Intuition	186
3.3.1.1	What Does Sartre Mean by "Intuition"?	187
3.3.1.2	Are Sartre's Claims About Intuition True?	187
3.3.1.3	Can Intuition Give Us Ethical Knowledge?	196
3.4	Subjectivism and Objectivism in Sartre	203
3.5	Sartre's Contribution to Ethics	207
	Notes	217
	Bibliography	245
	Index	257