Liberating Language: Sites of Rhetorical Education in Nineteenth-Century Black America Book

Iain D. Thomson gets a lot of points from me for presenting an argument that's very steeped in Heideggerian philosophy, yet easy to follow for someone willing to exert a bit of effort. At the same time, I think I don't agree with his conclusions. Essentially,each chapter serves as a step in a logical syllogism:
Ch 1: Heidegger's philosophy moves towards a commentary on ontotheology, which basically says that every major philosophical movement/epoch/age/whatever was bound by both a notion of ontology (the fundamental essence of things) and theology (a model form, often "God"), and that guided things for a while. Nietzchean philosophy, however, marks the point where the whole thing derails and becomes the right-to-power.
Ch 2: It's Heidegger's "The Question Concerning Ontology" brings the problem to a forefront, which is that we now conceive of everything as if it was a resource to use rather than something with its own being, and this problem is leading all forms of knowledge, particularly those from the university, to be considered purely in terms of its cash value.
Ch 3: Heidegger's tenure as Nazi Rector of Freiburg University was his attempt to restore knowledge to the university, but he moved too quickly, and got tangled up in the ontology of German fascism.
Ch 4: We need to fix the universities, but by being mindful of Heidegger's mistakes. Thomson offers the Plato cave model: we encourage students to realize their shackles, send them out, and take them back.

I don't necessarily disagree with the assertion that universities have moved a little too far to treating every subject and course as a stepping stone to a vocational position. I think Thomson's defense (or at least explanation) for Heidegger's choices under the Nazi regime is a little too pat,and his solution to "fixing" the system is at once a little naive and a bit to metaphorical to be useful. But it was a well-developed argument, at least, and it engages with some of the rougher edges of the Heidegger legacy without flinching.