Collective Decision-Making Book

	Editor's Preface
	Foreword
	List of Contributors
1	Introduction: Research Programs in Preference and Belief Aggregation	1
2	An Introduction to Arrovian Social Welfare Functions on Economic and Political Domains	25
3	Social Ranking of Allocations with and without Coalition Formation	63
4	Non Binary Social Choice: A Brief Introduction	79
5	Election Relations and a Partial Ordering for Positional Voting	93
6	Electing Legislatures	113
7	Preference-Based Stability: Experiments on Cooperative Solutions to Majority Rule Games	149
8	The Heart of a Polity	183
9	Refinements of the Heart	221
10	Bargaining in the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan	239
11	An Analysis of the Euskarian Parliament	251
12	Extending a Dynamic Model of Protocoalition Formation	265
13	The Sequential Dynamics of Cabinet Formation, Stochastic Error, and a Test of Competing Models	281
14	Subgame-Perfect Portfolio Allocations in Parliamentary Government Formation	295
15	The Costs of Coalition: The Italian Anomaly	315
16	Models of Interest Groups: Four Different Approaches	337
17	Partisan Electoral Cycles and Monetary Policy Games	363
18	Hypothesis Testing and Collective Decision-Making	385
19	Political Discourse, Factions, and the General Will: Correlated Voting and Condorcet's Jury Theorem	393
	Name Index	411
	Subject Index	417