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Preface | xi | |
Introductory Note | xiii | |
Part I | Basic Issues and Tools of Analysis | 1 |
Chapter 1 | What is a Political Economy? | 3 |
1.1. | Introduction | 3 |
1.2. | Politics and Economics | 5 |
1.3. | Types of Heterogeneity | 9 |
1.4. | An Illustration of Approaches | 12 |
1.5. | Plan of the Book | 18 |
Chapter 2 | Economic Models for Political Analysis | 20 |
2.1. | Introduction | 20 |
2.2. | The Principal-Agent Problem | 22 |
2.3. | Discrete Time Dynamic Models--Dynamic Programming | 31 |
2.4. | The Overlapping Generations Model | 35 |
2.5. | Effects of Uncertain Future Policies | 38 |
2.6. | Conclusions | 58 |
Chapter 3 | Decisionmaking Mechanisms | 60 |
3.1. | Introduction | 60 |
3.2. | How Much Political Detail? | 61 |
3.3. | Choosing Decisionmaking Mechanisms | 64 |
3.4. | Direct Democracy | 70 |
3.5. | Representative Democracy | 77 |
3.6. | Multiparty Systems | 85 |
3.7. | Interest Groups and Lobbying | 90 |
3.8. | Transaction Cost Politics | 96 |
3.9. | Conclusions | 98 |
Part II | Commitment, Credibility, and Reputation | 99 |
Chapter 4 | The Time-Consistency Problem | 101 |
4.1. | Introduction | 101 |
4.2. | Capital Taxation | 104 |
4.3. | Time Inconsistency as a Conflict of Interests | 110 |
4.4. | The Barro-Gordon Model | 113 |
4.5. | Seigniorage Revenue and the Optimum Quantity of Money | 121 |
4.6. | Commitment versus Flexibility | 126 |
4.7. | Conclusions | 130 |
Chapter 5 | Laws, Institutions, and Delegated Authority | 131 |
5.1. | Introduction | 131 |
5.2. | Laws, Constitutions, and Social Contracts | 132 |
5.3. | Delegation of Authority | 140 |
5.4. | Central Bank Independence | 142 |
5.5. | Fiscal Structures for Time Consistency | 157 |
5.6. | Conclusions | 164 |
Chapter 6 | Credibility and Reputation | 166 |
6.1. | Introduction | 166 |
6.2. | Reputation | 168 |
6.3. | "Reputation" under Complete Information | 169 |
6.4. | Reputation under Incomplete Information--Mimicking | 175 |
6.5. | Does Reputation "Solve" the Time-Consistency Problem?--Three Caveats | 183 |
6.6. | Signaling | 187 |
6.7. | Reputation for Not Reneging on Commitments | 195 |
6.8. | Credibility and External Circumstances | 201 |
6.9. | Ambiguity, Secrecy, and Imprecise Control | 208 |
6.10. | Conclusions | 214 |
Part III | Heterogeneity and Conflicting Interests | 217 |
Chapter 7 | Elections and Changes of Policymakers | 219 |
7.1. | Introduction | 219 |
7.2. | Elections and Policymaker Performance | 223 |
7.3. | The Opportunistic Political Business Cycle | 228 |
7.4. | Partisan Political Cycles | 246 |
7.5. | Competence and Prospective Voting | 268 |
7.6. | Campaign Promises | 278 |
7.7. | Interactions of the Executive and the Legislature | 283 |
7.8. | Multiparty Systems and Endogenous Election Dates | 293 |
7.9. | Tying the Hands of One's Replacement | 300 |
7.10. | Conclusions | 308 |
Chapter 8 | Redistribution | 309 |
8.1. | Introduction | 309 |
8.2. | Redistribution of Income | 311 |
8.3. | Differential Transfers | 318 |
8.4. | Nonmonetary Redistribution | 324 |
8.5. | Rent Seeking and Predation | 334 |
8.6. | Intergenerational Redistribution | 345 |
8.7. | Redistribution and Mobility | 354 |
8.8. | Conclusions | 370 |
Chapter 9 | Public Goods | 372 |
9.1. | Introduction | 372 |
9.2. | Public Goods--The Neoclassical Approach | 375 |
9.3. | Provision of Public Goods in Practice | 379 |
9.4. | Voluntary Provision of Public Goods--Free Riders and Collective Action | 382 |
9.5. | Voluntary Provision of Public Goods--Clubs | 391 |
9.6. | The Static Public Goods Game | 395 |
9.7. | The War of Attrition in Public Goods Provision | 397 |
9.8. | Conclusions | 401 |
Chapter 10 | Inaction, Delay, and Crisis | 403 |
10.1. | Introduction | 403 |
10.2. | Economic Arguments | 407 |
10.3. | Vested Interests | 411 |
10.4. | Nonadoption Due to Uncertainty about Individual Benefits | 414 |
10.5. | "Communication" Failures | 423 |
10.6. | Conflict over the Burden of Reform | 432 |
10.7. | Common Property Models | 439 |
10.8. | Economic Crises | 444 |
10.9. | Conclusions | 454 |
Part IV | Application to Policy Issues | 455 |
Chapter 11 | Factor Accumulation and Growth | 457 |
11.1. | Introduction | 457 |
11.2. | Basic Models of Fiscal Policy and Capital Accumulation | 461 |
11.3. | Imperfect Capital Markets, Externalities, and Endogenous Income Distribution | 474 |
11.4. | Political Institutions and Regimes | 488 |
11.5. | Socio-Political Instability | 500 |
11.6. | Empirical Determinants of Growth | 513 |
11.7. | Conclusions | 524 |
Chapter 12 | The International Economy | 526 |
12.1. | Introduction | 526 |
Part I | Exchange-Rate Arrangements | 529 |
12.2. | Fixed versus Flexible Exchange Rates | 529 |
12.3. | Currency Crises and Contagious Speculative Attacks | 536 |
12.4. | Monetary Unions | 544 |
Part II | Macroeconomic Interdependence | 559 |
12.5. | International Policy Cooperation | 559 |
12.6. | Political Responses to External Shocks | 579 |
Part III | International Capital and Aid Flows | 580 |
12.7. | Capital Controls | 580 |
12.8. | Sovereign Borrowing | 587 |
12.9. | Foreign Aid | 601 |
12.10. | Conclusions | 613 |
Chapter 13 | Economic Reform and Transition | 615 |
13.1. | Introduction | 615 |
13.2. | Defining the Issues | 617 |
13.3. | Economic and Political Constraints | 621 |
13.4. | The Implications of Magnitude--A Formal Analysis | 626 |
13.5. | Heterogeneity and Political Constraints | 632 |
13.6. | Labor Reallocation | 643 |
13.7. | Privatization | 653 |
13.8. | Price Liberalization | 663 |
13.9. | Conclusions | 674 |
Chapter 14 | The Size of Government and the Number of Nations | 675 |
14.1. | Introduction | 675 |
14.2. | The Scope of Government | 677 |
14.3. | The Size of Government--Government Spending | 679 |
14.4. | Government Debt and Deficits | 690 |
14.5. | Budgetary Rules and Institutions | 697 |
14.6. | The Number of Nations | 707 |
14.7. | Conclusions | 731 |
Bibliography | 735 | |
Author Index | 765 | |
Subject Index | 771 |
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Add Political Economy in Macroeconomics, Originally, economics was called political economy, and those studying it readily accepted that economic decisions are made in a political world. But economics eventually separated itself from politics to pursue rigorous methods of analyzing individual be, Political Economy in Macroeconomics to the inventory that you are selling on WonderClubX
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Add Political Economy in Macroeconomics, Originally, economics was called political economy, and those studying it readily accepted that economic decisions are made in a political world. But economics eventually separated itself from politics to pursue rigorous methods of analyzing individual be, Political Economy in Macroeconomics to your collection on WonderClub |