Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance Book

Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance, In this major reinterpretation of the evolution of the American corporation, Mark Roe convincingly demonstrates that the ownership structure of large U.S. firms owes its distinctive character as much to politics as to economics and technology. His provoca, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance

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Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance
Written by author Mark J. Roe
Published by Princeton University Press, March 1996
In this major reinterpretation of the evolution of the American corporation, Mark Roe convincingly demonstrates that the ownership structure of large U.S. firms owes its distinctive character as much to politics as to economics and technology. His provoca
"No one before has ever written a comprehensive poltical history of the fragmentation of stock ownership nor demonstrated the critical role that this fragmentation has played in shaping the power of managers in the American business system. Roe has provid

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Book Categories

Authors

Preface
Introduction
Pt. I The Economic Paradigm 1
Ch. 1 Diffuse Ownership as Natural Economic Evolution 3
Ch. 2 Fragmentation's Costs 9
Pt. II The Political Paradigm 19
Ch. 3 Diffuse Ownership as Political Product 21
Ch. 4 A Political Theory 26
Pt. III The Historical Evidence 51
Ch. 5 Banks 54
Ch. 6 Insurers 60
Ch. 7 Banks Again 94
Ch. 8 Mutual Funds 102
Ch. 9 Pension Funds 124
Pt. IV The Contemporary and Comparative Evidence 147
Ch. 10 Takeovers 151
Ch. 11 Corporate Ownership in Germany and Japan 169
Ch. 12 A Small Comparative Test of the Political Theory 187
Ch. 13 Counterpoint I 198
Ch. 14 Political Evolution in Germany and Japan? 210
Ch. 15 Trends in the United States 222
Ch. 16 An American Crossroads 226
Pt. V Policy Recommendations 231
Ch. 17 Managers as the Problem? 235
Ch. 18 Short-Term Finance as the Problem? 240
Ch. 19 Industrial Organization as the Problem? 248
Ch. 20 Counterpoint II 254
Ch. 21 Changing the American Ownership Structure? 263
Conclusion 283
Bibliography 289
Acknowledgments 309
Index 311

Title: Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance

Manufacturer:

University Press

Item Number: 9780691026312

Publication Date: March 1996

Product Description: Full Name: Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance; Short Name:Strong Managers, Weak Owners

Universal Product Code (UPC): 9780691026312

WonderClub Stock Keeping Unit (WSKU): 9780691026312

Rating: 4.5/5 based on 2 Reviews

Image Location: https://wonderclub.com/images/covers/63/12/9780691026312.jpg

Category: Media >> Books

Weight: 0.200 kg (0.44 lbs)

Width: 6.150 cm (2.42 inches)

Heigh : 9.230 cm (3.63 inches)

Depth: 0.870 cm (0.34 inches)

Date Added: August 25, 2020, Added By: Ross

Date Last Edited: August 25, 2020, Edited By: Ross

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Steve Neal

reviewed Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance on July 02, 2013

Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance

What can you say about a classic? It persuasively demanded that corporate theorists recognize the place noneconomic political forces like populism and preference for local banking have played in making corporate governance what it is. I would be interested in finding an retrospective after the deregulation of the late 90s to see whether that has changed the situation.

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Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance, In this major reinterpretation of the evolution of the American corporation, Mark Roe convincingly demonstrates that the ownership structure of large U.S. firms owes its distinctive character as much to politics as to economics and technology. His provoca, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance

Add Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance, In this major reinterpretation of the evolution of the American corporation, Mark Roe convincingly demonstrates that the ownership structure of large U.S. firms owes its distinctive character as much to politics as to economics and technology. His provoca, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance to the inventory that you are selling on WonderClub

Add Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance, In this major reinterpretation of the evolution of the American corporation, Mark Roe convincingly demonstrates that the ownership structure of large U.S. firms owes its distinctive character as much to politics as to economics and technology. His provoca, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance to your collection on WonderClub

Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance Book

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	Preface
	Introduction
Pt. I	The Economic Paradigm	1
Ch. 1	Diffuse Ownership as Natural Economic Evolution	3
Ch. 2	Fragmentation's Costs	9
Pt. II	The Political Paradigm	19
Ch. 3	Diffuse Ownership as Political Product	21
Ch. 4	A Political Theory	26
Pt. III	The Historical Evidence	51
Ch. 5	Banks	54
Ch. 6	Insurers	60
Ch. 7	Banks Again	94
Ch. 8	Mutual Funds	102
Ch. 9	Pension Funds	124
Pt. IV	The Contemporary and Comparative Evidence	147
Ch. 10	Takeovers	151
Ch. 11	Corporate Ownership in Germany and Japan	169
Ch. 12	A Small Comparative Test of the Political Theory	187
Ch. 13	Counterpoint I	198
Ch. 14	Political Evolution in Germany and Japan?	210
Ch. 15	Trends in the United States	222
Ch. 16	An American Crossroads	226
Pt. V	Policy Recommendations	231
Ch. 17	Managers as the Problem?	235
Ch. 18	Short-Term Finance as the Problem?	240
Ch. 19	Industrial Organization as the Problem?	248
Ch. 20	Counterpoint II	254
Ch. 21	Changing the American Ownership Structure?	263
	Conclusion	283
	Bibliography	289
	Acknowledgments	309
	Index	311