Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook Book

	Preface
1	Public choice in perspective	1
2	Economic theories of the state	21
3	Neither markets nor states: Linking transformation processes in collective action arenas	35
4	The political economy of federalism	73
5	The public choice on international organizations	106
6	Constitutional public choice	124
7	Cycling and majority rule	149
8	Majority rule	163
9	Group choice and individual judgments	181
10	Some paradoxes of preference aggregation	201
11	Voting and the revelation of preferences for public activities	226
12	The spatial analysis of elections and committees: Four decades of research	247
13	Multiparty electoral politics	271
14	Interest groups: Money, information, and influence	296
15	Logrolling	322
16	Political business cycles	342
17	When is it rational to vote?	373
18	Voting behavior	391
19	Public choice experiments	415
20	Modern bureaucratic theory	429
21	The positive theory of public bureaucracy	455
22	The political economy of taxation	481
23	Rent seeking	506
24	Endogenous protection: The empirical evidence	526
25	Why does government's share of national income grow? An assessment of the recent literature on the U.S. experience	562
	References	591
	Name index	656
	Subject index	668