The Metaphysics of Apes: Negotiating the Animal-Human Boundary Book

The Metaphysics of Apes is a well-written history of animal-human boundaries, focusing predominately on the primate and human boundary. Corbey comes at this subject from a naturalistic bias that values our primate ancestry, but his book is an account of the history of those who have been gatekeepers for human specialness (exceptionalism), i.e., not ape, not primate, and especially, not animal. Thus, for example, we have Aristotle's and Descartes' rational man and its dualistic opposite, animal passion. We have Christain (not animal) soul, and we have modern intellectual history that makes a rather sudden anthropological ("scientific")break between us, who are "fully human," from our distinct primate cousins. It's not so clear why Corbey uses the title he does as his history only bounces along the surface of metaphysics (first principles of things). This beomes clear in his last chapter where he tries to resolve this historical dualism by some intellectual process ("epistemological ontology"?) that is unconvincing (and impenetrable). Regarding this dualism, the more relevant approach is to probe deeply into why this boundary issue is an issue at all. This is an emotional, not an intellectual issue. Why is it so important to keep animals in their place? Why is it so important that we not see ourselves as apes, even special apes? Why can't we see ourselves as animals with a strong rational faculty (that serves what?)? Do we not seek food and sexual partners? Do we not deficate and urinate? Do we not become ill and die? Do apes, akin to man, not have mind? Do all beings, like us, not seek to be free? These book's last chapter would have benefited more by pursuing these types of metaphysical questions.