Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information (Rand Studies in Policy Analysis Series) Book

I'm not going to pretend like this will be an unbiased review. I am a huge Keegan fan and have read five of his other books. Keegan's method, one of which I am particularly fond, attempts to give the reader a broader understanding of military history. This is not done by sketching an overall connective and encompassing outline but instead by taking a few slices from different eras and showing how they fit into the larger history. Both the small and large scale are needed to interpret and comprehend the other fully. In this work, he starts with Nelson in 1798 and essentially ends with the Falklands War. He touches on Al-Qaeda but not much history is given.

As I have come to expect from him, Keegan writes with both clarity and density in 'Intelligence in War'. I had to resist the urge to highlight entire pages. Even for the events of which I was knowledgeable, he added detail and analysis that was enlightening. I read a book entirely on the Falklands War and yet his partial chapter on it added details I didn't know. With all this being said, let me add some reflections on the book.

1) The book is heavy on the naval side. This isn't necessarily a bad thing; I find naval warfare fascinating. But I do wonder if it skews the analysis. Perhaps it would be worth splitting it into two volumes: one for naval and the other for land operations. I will return to the scope of the book later. But as it stands, there are chapters on The Mediterranean Campaign of 1798, von Spee's East Asia Squadron, The Battle of Midway, The Battle of the Atlantic, and a portion of the last chapter on The Falklands War. Land campaigns covered are only Shenandoah Valley and Crete. The hunt for the V1/V2 programs doesn't fit into either category neatly. Maybe it could be considered an air campaign.

2) It is also heavy on the modern side; four of the chapters are from WWII. His other books tend to have a better balance from different eras. Part of his point seems to be that useful intelligence was almost non-existent before electronic means of transmitting data. Maybe he is correct here, particularly from a strategic viewpoint, but this leads to my next point:

3) His definition of military intelligence seems rather narrow. I think the book does a good job of creating skepticism towards what might be a mythologized form of military intelligence: a key piece of information is discovered and a general alters his battle order last minute to seize victory. And to be fair, he does specify that he is only referring to operational intelligence. But why not speak of intelligence more broadly? I wonder if Keegan's theme is aimed at an attitude much more prevalent in the UK than the US. After all, the "WWII was won with American steel, British intelligence, and Russian blood" is still repeated ad nauseam today. Perhaps in Britain the idea of intelligence equaling victory is popular. Otherwise, I wonder who holds the view he argues against. I have heard that human intelligence needed/needs to be rediscovered in the war on terror but he agrees that, in this case, good intelligence will be invaluable. And hence, point 4.

4) While the war of terror has a larger scope, it is not fundamentally different from a whole host of wars throughout history. By acting like the GWOT introduces some new scenario where intelligence is of utmost importance ignores the entire history of small wars, insurgencies, and guerilla strategies. He even mentions in passing that these types of wars in the second half of the 20th century involved more of the world's population than World War II. Keegan seems to completely sideline half of military history, which is most notable because it is precisely the type of conflict in which intelligence is a primary asset. This omission, in my opinion, weakens the book far more than the other issues previously mentioned.

Keegan's book offers a great deal of knowledge on battles or operations unknown to many readers. He writes with lucidity and depth about the slices of history he highlights and I would recommend the book to anyone interested in military history. However, unlike many of his other books, I do not feel that these slices are a good representation of the overall picture and I am not convinced of his overarching thesis. Actually, I should be more specific. I'm unclear about exactly how far he wants to push his thesis. Does intelligence alone win wars? Of course not, but no one is arguing that as far as I can see. So how useful is military intelligence? Not very, seems to be Keegan's answer. But I think his scope is strangely still too limited and the framing too restrictive for a satisfying answer.

Final note: this was written in 2002, so be prepared for some remarks on Iraq that have aged, let's say, quite poorly