Political Economy: Institutions, Competition and Representation: Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics Book

	Series editor's preface
	List of contributors
	Political economy: A personal interpretation and an overview	1
I	Perspectives on political economy
1	Political ideology, communication, and community	25
2	Implementation and enforcement in institutional modeling	51
3	Toward a theory of institutional change	61
4	The development of contemporary political theory	71
II	Representation and voting
5	Proportional representation, approval voting, and coalitionally straightforward elections	107
6	Party competition in a spatial model of coalition formation	135
7	Some foundations for empirical study in the Euclidean spatial model of social choice	175
III	Political institutions
8	Communication in institutions: Efficiency in a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with hidden information	197
9	The courts and slavery in the United States: Property rights and credible commitment	223
10	On the pervasiveness of sophisticated sincerity	247
11	Initial versus continuing proposal power in legislative seniority systems	279
IV	Political competition
12	Adverse selection and moral hazard in a repeated elections model	295
13	Campaign contributions and party-candidate competition in services and policies	313
14	Polarization, incumbency, and the personal vote	355
15	Credibility and the responsiveness of direct legislation	379
V	Information acquisition by government
16	Information acquisition and orthogonal argument	407
17	A welfare analysis of political action	437
VI	Government behavior
18	Monetary policy and credibility under exact monetary aggregation	465
19	A general equilibrium model with endogenous government behavior	487