The Shapley Value: Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley Book

Preface;

1. Introduction to the Shapley value Alvin E. Roth;

Part I. Ancestral Papers:
2. A value for n-person games Lloyd S. Shapley;
3. A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik;

Part II. Reformulation and Generalizations:
4. The expected utility of playing a game Alvin E. Roth;
5. The Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices as probabilities Philip D. Straffin, Jr.;
6. Weighted Shapley values Ehud Kalai and Dov Samet;
7. Probabilistic values for games Robert James Weber;
8. Combinatorial representations of the Shapley value based on average relative payoffs Uriel G. Rothblum;
9. The potential of the Shapley value Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell;
10. Multilinear extensions of games Guillermo Owen;

Part III. Coalitions:
11. Coalitional value Mordecai Kurz;
12. Endogenous formation of links between players and the coalitions: an application of the Shapley value Robert J. Aumann and Roger B. Myerson;

Part IV. Large Games:
13. Values of large finite games Myrna Holtz Wooders and William R. Zame;
14. Payoffs in nonatomic economics: an axiomatic approach Pradeep Dubley and Abraham Neyman;
15. Values of smooth nonatomic games: the method of multilinear approximation Dov Monderer and Abraham Neyman;
16. Nondifferentiable TU markets: the value Jean-François Mertens;

Part V. Cost Allocation and Fair Division:
17. Individual contribution and just compensation H. P. Young;
18. The Aumann-Shapley prices: a survey Yair Tauman;

Part VI. NTU Games:
19. Utility comparison and the theory ofgames Lloyd S. Shapley;
20. Paths leading to the Nash set Michael Maschler, Guillermo Owen and Bezalel Peleg.