Sold Out
Book Categories |
Left freely to themselves, a group of rational individuals often fail to cooperate even when the product of social cooperation is beneficial to all. Hence, the author argues, a rule of collective decision making is clearly needed that specifies how social cooperation should be organised among contributing individuals. Suzumura gives a systematic presentation of the Arrovian impossibility theorems of social choice theory, so as to describe and enumerate the various factors that are responsible for the stability of the voluntary association of free and rational individuals. Among other topics covered are an axiomatic characterisation of the concept of a rational choice, the simple majority decision rule and its extensions, the social choice implications of the concept of equity as nonenvy, the constrained majoritarian collective choice rules and the conflict between the Paretian ethics and the libertarian claims of individual rights.
Login|Complaints|Blog|Games|Digital Media|Souls|Obituary|Contact Us|FAQ
CAN'T FIND WHAT YOU'RE LOOKING FOR? CLICK HERE!!! X
You must be logged in to add to WishlistX
This item is in your Wish ListX
This item is in your CollectionRational choice, collective decisions, and social welfare
X
This Item is in Your InventoryRational choice, collective decisions, and social welfare
X
You must be logged in to review the productsX
X
X
Add Rational choice, collective decisions, and social welfare, , Rational choice, collective decisions, and social welfare to the inventory that you are selling on WonderClubX
X
Add Rational choice, collective decisions, and social welfare, , Rational choice, collective decisions, and social welfare to your collection on WonderClub |