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Book Categories |
Introduction | 1 | |
Ch. 1 | Peirce and James | 15 |
I | Two Kinds of Pragmatism | 16 |
II | Jamesian Pragmatists | 26 |
III | Thought as the Venue for Action | 30 |
IV | World-Making | 31 |
V | Making a Social World | 35 |
VI | Some Notions of Truth | 36 |
VII | Power and Respect among World-Makers | 39 |
VIII | Peircian Realism | 42 |
IX | Putnam and Peirce | 45 |
X | Opposed Ideas about Reality and Knowledge | 53 |
XI | The Transcendental World-Maker | 59 |
XII | Must Truth be the Function of Value? | 64 |
Ch. 2 | Two Kinds of Thinking: Hypothesis and Construction | 66 |
I | Two Kinds of Thinking | 66 |
II | The Motive for World-Making | 68 |
III | Textualism | 73 |
IV | The Dependence of Existence on Truth | 76 |
V | World-Making as Psycho-centric | 80 |
VI | Thought as Hypothesis | 84 |
VII | Distinguishing Hypothesis from Construction | 88 |
VIII | Hypotheses are Conventional Signs | 95 |
IX | Hypotheses Motivated by Values | 96 |
X | Conclusion | 99 |
Ch. 3 | The Cognitive-Affective Basis for Value | 101 |
I | Spinoza on Desire | 101 |
II | Truths Valued for their Efficacy | 102 |
III | The Objective and Subjective Bases for Value | 103 |
IV | Vulnerability and Security | 105 |
V | Submission and Control: Self-Sufficiency and Dependence | 105 |
VI | Cognitive-Affective Balance | 109 |
VII | Pathologies | 111 |
VIII | Freudian Themes | 113 |
IX | Differences and Affinities among Cognitive-Affective Balances | 114 |
X | Pleasure | 117 |
XI | Holism | 119 |
XII | Hypothesis | 121 |
Ch. 4 | Truth | 124 |
I | Is Truth Simple and Separable? | 124 |
II | Truth as Coherence | 128 |
III | Truth as Identity | 160 |
IV | Truth as Redundancy | 169 |
V | Behaviorist Notions of Truth | 186 |
VI | Conclusion | 197 |
Ch. 5 | Truth as Correspondence | 199 |
I | The Rationale for Truth as Correspondence | 199 |
II | Abductive Inference | 202 |
III | A Preliminary Realist Ontology | 208 |
IV | Natural and Conventional Signs | 210 |
V | Truth as Correspondence | 214 |
VI | Thirteen Kinds of Truth-Claim | 226 |
VII | The Realist Ontology Amended | 260 |
VIII | A Final Elaboration of the Realist Ontology: Eternal Possibilities | 263 |
IX | The Thirteen Kinds of Truth-Claim, Again | 272 |
X | The Uses of the Coherence, Identity, and Redundancy Notions of Truth | 285 |
XI | Is the Argument for Correspondence Circular? | 289 |
XII | Paradoxes of Self-Reference | 293 |
XIII | Truth and Value | 295 |
Ch. 6 | Rational Attitude and Desire | 297 |
I | Truth Informs Desire | 297 |
II | Salient Truths | 304 |
III | Deliberation and its Subject Matters | 306 |
IV | Is Our Place in the World Fixed? | 311 |
V | Truth-Informed Attitudes and Desires as Determinants of Choice | 312 |
VI | Aristotle, Nietzsche, and Dewey on Truth and Choice | 315 |
VII | Truth's Debt to Value | 329 |
Notes | 331 | |
Index | 349 |
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Add Truth's Debt to Value, Is something true because we believe it to be so or because it is true? How can a culturally bound community achieve scientific knowledge when values, attitudes, and desires shape its beliefs? In this book an eminent philosopher considers various schools , Truth's Debt to Value to the inventory that you are selling on WonderClubX
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Add Truth's Debt to Value, Is something true because we believe it to be so or because it is true? How can a culturally bound community achieve scientific knowledge when values, attitudes, and desires shape its beliefs? In this book an eminent philosopher considers various schools , Truth's Debt to Value to your collection on WonderClub |