Topics in Social Choice : Sophisticated Voting, Efficacy and Proportional Representation Book

Preface

Sophisticated Voting under the Plurality and Approval Procedures: Theoretical Models and Experimental Evidence

Sophisticated Voting: Orientation and General Approach

Two Models of Sophisticated Voting: Farquharson and Niemi-Frank

The Social Desirability of Sincere and Sophisticated Voting under the Plurality and Approval Procedures

The Chairman's Paradox and Its Extensions under Sophisticated Plurality and Approval Voting According to Models F and NF

The Condorcet-Efficiency of Sophisticated Voting According to Model F under the Plurality and Approval Procedures

Tacit Cooperation in Three-Alternative Noncooperative Voting Games: A New Model of Sophisticated Behavior under the Plurality and Approval Procedures

Sincere versus Sophisticated Behavior Under PV and AV: A Competitive Test of Four Models

Efficacy and "Correct Decisions"

Efficacy in Small Electorates under the Plurality and Approval Procedures

Is Cumulative Voting Really Different from Plurality Voting?

On Combining Approval with Disapproval Voting

Majority Rule, "Correct Decisions," and the Quorum Paradox

Proportional Representation: Normative Schemes and an Empirical Evaluation of Voting Procedures

Microcosms and Macrocosms: Normative Schemes for Seat Allocation in Proportional Representation Systems

Proportional Representation: An Empirical Evaluation of the Plurality and Approval Procedures

Appendix A: Possible Size Relations Among Four Blocs

Appendix B: Proof of the Propositions in Chapter 6

Appendix C: Detailed Results of Experiments 1 and 2

Bibliography

Author Index

Subject Index