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1 Introduction 1
1.1 'Free'---a ruling 1
1.2 'Determinism'---a ruling 4
1.3 Dramatis personae 5
1.4 The unimportance of determinism 7
1.5 Theories and theorists 8
1.6 A sketch of the argument 15
PART I METAPHYSICS AND COMMITMENT
2 Libertarianism, Action, and Self-Determination 21
2.1 Introduction; the argument summarized 21
2.2 Libertarianism; a constraint 27
2.3 The explanation of action 29
2.4 Libertarianism: the constraint applied 35
2.5 Locating indeterminism 37
2.6 Can indeterminism help? 38
2.7 Evasion: the notion of choice 38
2.8 The impossibility of self-determination as to desire 41
2.9 Relocating indeterminism 43
2.10 A 'Leibnizian' view 45
2.11 Restatement and conclusion 48
3 Kant And Commitment 52
3.1 Commitment theories: their structure 52
3.2 'Neutral' and 'Rational' freedom 54
3.3 Non-moral freedom 55
3.4 'Will' and 'desire' 57
3.5 Kant's commitment theory 58
3.6 The inescapability of belief in freedom 60
3.7 Another approach 61
3.8 A subjectivist conclusion 62
4 Commitment, Illusion, And Truth 64
4.1 Double standards 64
4.2 Experiential facts 65
4.3 Appearances and their reality 66
4.4 Reality and its appearances 69
5 Non-Rational Commitment: A View Of Freedom 72
5.1 Introduction 72
5.2 Feelings, attitudes, practices, concepts, and beliefs 73
5.3 Commitment and rationality 76
6 Phenomenology, Commitment, And What Might Happen 80
6.1 Feelings and the causality of reason; doings and happenings 80
6.2 Determinism, action, and the self; a thought-experiment 82
6.3 What might happen 86
6.4 Natural compatibilism 90
6.5 The true centre of commitment 94
6.6 Satkayadrsti 101
PART II THE OBJECTIVIST BASIS
7 Objectivism: Preliminaries 107
7.1 How things stand; determinism dismissed 107
7.2 Free agents 109
7.3 A provisional definition 112
8 Choice 115
8.1 Introduction 115
8.2 Ability to choose 116
8.3 Fido's choice 122
8.4 Conclusion 124
9 Self-Consciousness 126
9.1 Mental reflexivity and full self-consciousness 126
9.2 An attempt at demystification 130
9.3 The idea of mental singleness 133
9.4 Self-consciousness, someonehood, and freedom 139
9.5 Who is to blame? 143
9.6 Self-consciousness and choice 144
9.7 Conclusion and anticipation 146
PART III THE SUBJECTIVIST CHALLENGE
10 Evidence and Independence 151
10.1 The principal claim 151
10.2 Explicit° belief 151
10.3 The principle of independence 152
10.4 Evident propositions 154
10.5 Fully self-conscious belief 154
10.6 Evidentness---a natural picture 155
10.7 'Causally evident' 156
10.8 Generalization; evident properties 157
10.9 The problem restated---non-causally evident properties 158
10.10 Causation and constitution; C-statements 162
10.11 Options and questions 167
10.12 Constitution relations---complications 168
10.13 Summary; a compatibilist way out 170
10.14 Transitional 172
11 Contravention and Convention 175
11.1 Introductory 175
11.2 Contracts 176
11.3 The attribution of belief 178
11.4 The mystery draw 181
11.5 Natural and conventional properties 184
11.6 Omniscience 185
11.7 Immorality 186
11.8 Pain 194
11.9 'E' 196
11.10 Conclsion 198
11.11 Anticipation 200
12 The Spectator Subject and Integration 203
12.1 Introductory 203
12.2 Une Etrangere 204
12.3 The normal and the spectatorial 206
12.4 A race of spectators 207
12.5 Restatement 208
12.6 The spectator and belief in freedom 209
12.7 An initial conclusion 211
12.8 The Integration condition 212
12.9 An Attitudinal-theoretic position 214
12.10 Determinists---life and theory 215
13 The Natural Epictetans 218
13.1 An initial description 218
13.2 Elaboration 220
13.3 Hindrances and indecision 224
14 The Experience Of Ability To Choose 227
14.1 Preliminaries 227
14.2 Experience of indecision 231
14.3 Backtracking 233
14.4 The Ability Suggestion and the Ability Account 234
14.5 An alternative approach? 237
14.6 The Ability Account, the Basic Structural Account, and a quasi-Kantian view 238
14.7 Counter-attack 241
14.8 The rejection of the Ability Suggestion 242
14.9 The Indecision Suggestion 249
14.10 Objection: the concept of choice 250
14.11 Objectivist options 252
14.12 Conclusion 254
15 Subjectivism and Experience Of Freedom 257
15.1 The espousal of Subjectivism 257
15.2 Subjectivism: prospects for a positive theory of freedom 258
15.3 Contravention: the options 260
15.4 Conclusion 267
16 Antinomy and Truth 269
16.1 What do we want? 269
16.2 What should we believe? 273
Appendix A Problem about experience 279
Appendix B Free choices and objective branching points 280
Appendix C The brain in the vat as free agent 281
Appendix D A strange god 282
Appendix E The sense of self 283
Appendix F The Objectivists' last ditch 288
Appendix G Free agents 291
Bibliography 317
Index 321
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