Dynamics and Relativity Book

At 110 pages (text, endnotes, bibliography, and index), this book is deceptively meaty - especially for a "guide for the perplexed."

Mosteller discusses arguments for and against relativism in the tradition of analytic philosophy; so, you'll get a lot of this:

"According to Putnam, when P1 asserts premise 1 of RMS above, P1 is making a claim about C2. However, P1's claim about P2's C2 can only be true in P1's C1, just as P2 is nothing but something constructed out of P1's experiences in MS."

But, don't let that scare you away! Though some backgroud knowledge in philosophy would be useful, the layman can reap rewards if s/he puts in the requistite hard work.

Mosteller (i) gives a definition and brief history of relativism, discusses (ii) epistemological, (iii) ontological, (iv) ethical, and (v) asthetic reletavisms, and, lastly, (vi) closes by discussing (a) the nature of worldviews, (b) relativisms in science, politics, and religion, and then (c) looks at whether there are any such things as locally neutral standards which would make the no neutrality thesis of relativism false.

Mosteller argues that all kinds of relativism (under his definition) are, if they deny the possibility of existence or reality or knowledge or norms, self-refuting.

He also shows that many of the positive arguments for relativism are based on non-sequiturs. For example, one of the most popular arguments you'll run across is, actually, simply an observation that people differ about, say, ethical beliefs or asthetic judgments. But, this is simply descriptive relativism - and that doesn't get to prescriptive. It doesn't follow from the fact that people disagree about, say, ethical principles, that ethical principle are, therefore, relative to subjects or cultures. Or, the fact that some people may find one thing beautiful and other people may find it ugly does not logically entail that "beauty is in the eye of the beholder."

Many arguments were fairly traditional - though more rigorously stated. One interesting argument I did come across, though, was one put forward by Hillary Putnam against epistemological relativism ER. He argued that it was possible that ER entailed a kind of solipsism (the doctrine that only me and my experiences exist, or are real). Some versions of ER state that "truth" is whatever is "true for me." So the truth about anything is a simply a function of a person's disposition to believe. Therefore, the truth about any of us, besides the relativist, is just a function of the relativists disposition to believe. Thus, for the relativist, there is no extra mental truth about me or you or anyone else. What is true about me depends on the consciousness of the relativist.

Overall, if you're perplexed about relativism, and you are motivated to read analytic philosophy, this book should prove to be a good "guide" for you.