Being Known Book

1	The Integration Challenge	1
2	Truth, Content, and the Epistemic	13
2.1	The Linking Thesis	13
2.2	Consequences of the Argument for the Linking Thesis	32
2.3	The Linking Thesis and the Integration Challenge	36
2.4	Three Indicators for Solutions	40
2.5	A Look Ahead: Two Styles of Solution	48
Appendix	Factive Reasons and Taking a Representational State at Face Value	51
3	The Past	56
3.1	The Property-Identity Link and its Role in Understanding	57
3.2	Past-Tense Truth: Some Metaphysics	68
3.3	Externalist Elements in Understanding the Past Tense	89
3.4	Memory and the Property-Identity Link	97
3.5	'The Explanation by Means of Identity Does Not Work Here': When and How It Does	104
3.6	Realism, Metaphysics, and the Theory of Meaning	111
3.7	Final Observations on the Temporal Case	118
4	Necessity	119
4.1	Problems and Goals	119
4.2	Admissibility, the Principles of Possibility, and the Modal Extension Principle	125
4.3	Other Principles of Possibility and the Truth Conditions of Modal Statements	144
4.4	Modalism, Understanding, Reduction	155
4.5	The Epistemology of Metaphysical Necessity	160
4.6	Against the Thinker-Dependence of Necessity	176
4.7	Neo-Wittgensteinian Challenges	184
Appendix A	Modal Logic and the Principle-Based Conception	191
Appendix B	Relaxing the Assumptions	198
5	Self-Knowledge and Intentional Content	203
5.1	Conscious Attitudes, Self-Ascription, and the Occupation of Attention	205
5.2	First Steps towards a Solution: Rational Sensitivity without Inference	214
5.3	Between Internal Introspectionism and 'No-Reasons' Accounts	223
5.4	Why do these Self-Ascriptions Amount to Knowledge?	235
5.5	Conceptual Redeployment: Supporting the Claim	245
5.6	Three Consequences of Redeployment	251
6	Self-Knowledge and Illusions of Transcendence	263
6.1	Representational Independence	264
6.2	Delta Theories	272
6.3	Representational Independence Outside the First Person?	279
6.4	An Illusion and its Source	282
6.5	Self-Knowledge, Subjectlessness, and Reductionist Views	289
7	Freedom	302
7.1	The Classical Problem and the Integration Challenge	302
7.2	An Intuitive Characterization of Freedom	305
7.3	'Could Have Done Otherwise': The Closeness Account	309
7.4	A Puzzling Inference	316
7.5	The Closeness Conception Elaborated	320
7.6	Non-Theoretical Construals of Freedom	329
7.7	Libertarianism	331
7.8	The Epistemology of Freedom	335
7.9	Neither Too Much nor Too Little?	339
8	Concluding Remarks	341
	Bibliography	343
	Index	353