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Chapter 1. | Introduction | 3 |
Part I. | Relations Between Mind and Value | |
Chapter 2. | Objectivity | 9 |
1. | Terminology and distinctions: cognitivism, realism, centralism, and objectivism about reasons for action | 9 |
2. | Parallels: centralism about colour, law, and logic, and some preliminary doubts | 15 |
3. | Wittgensteinian and Davidsonian arguments applied against centralism, and how the issue about centralism cuts across the issue about cognitivism | 20 |
4. | A coherence account and the threats of overdetermination and of indeterminacy | 28 |
Chapter 3. | Disagreement | 30 |
1. | A coherence account and the locus of disagreement | 30 |
2. | Disagreement in form of life and substantive disagreement | 31 |
3. | Practices as criteria of agreement in form of life; constraints on interpretation vs. ultra-interpretations | 33 |
4. | The antecedence doctrine and substantive disagreement; disagreement about colours? | 38 |
5. | Uncontestable concepts | 43 |
6. | Conceivably contestable concepts | 45 |
7. | Essentially contested concepts | 46 |
8. | The shifting locus of substantive disagreement and the limits of substantive and conceptual difference | 50 |
Chapter 4. | Preference | 55 |
1. | Survey of the arguments of three chapters and introduction to the 'problem' of the eligibility of interpretations | 55 |
2. | Conceptions of the preference relation and examples of the 'problem' involving transitivity | 58 |
3. | An intuitive introduction to the general idea of independence conditions | 64 |
4. | Mutual Preferential Independence and the individuation of criteria | 69 |
5. | The argument yet again, this time concerning Independence and the individuation of alternatives: axiom-conservatism vs. data-conservatism | 76 |
Chapter 5. | Interpretation | 84 |
1. | The need for substantive as well as formal constraints on eligibility: a sample of views | 84 |
2. | Special feelings don't help | 88 |
3. | Constraint by natural and social environment: the rejection of psychological individualism | 90 |
4. | The mind as world-laden: naturalism vs. idealism | 92 |
5. | The role of empirical information: the causation of particular mental states vs. the individuation of their contents in terms of normal causal relations | 95 |
6. | Causal relations, causal explanations, and rational explanations | 96 |
7. | Constraint by reasons and values: interpretation does not compete with science | 98 |
Chapter 6. | Subjectivism | 102 |
1. | Preference as value-laden | 102 |
2. | Extended preference and interpersonal comparisons | 105 |
3. | Substantive constraints on extended preference, human nature, and ethical disagreement | 112 |
4. | Disagreement and democracy | 120 |
Part II. | Conflicting Reasons and Values | |
Chapter 7. | Conflict | 125 |
1. | Conflict of reasons: real or apparent? | 125 |
2. | Restricted agglomerativity: the relational form vs. the indexed form | 128 |
3. | Prima facie reasons vs. pro tanto reasons, and the absence of evidential akrasia | 130 |
Chapter 8. | Akrasia | 136 |
1. | Irrational systems and rational subsystems; conflicts within persons and conflicts between persons | 136 |
2. | The irrationality of taking the unit of agency as fixed | 145 |
3. | Some illustrations | 149 |
4. | Collective action, self-determination, and ethics | 156 |
5. | Attributions of akrasia: conflict and formal vs. substantive constraints on eligibility | 159 |
6. | Some possible examples of evidential akrasia disposed of: the warming effect | 163 |
Chapter 9. | Cognitivism | 171 |
1. | The compatibility of conflict and cognitivism | 171 |
2. | Frege against the proliferation of force | 175 |
3. | Geach and Dummett on the proliferation of force | 176 |
4. | The independence of Frege's argument from the availability of additional modes of inference | 180 |
5. | The objection from skepticism | 185 |
Part III. | Rationality in the Face of Conflicting Reasons | |
Chapter 10. | Theory | 189 |
1. | The refutation of conventionalism | 189 |
2. | Emotivism and legal positivism as conventionalism | 191 |
3. | Coherence and the role of theory | 193 |
4. | Coherence, naturalism, and the authority of theory | 196 |
5. | The practice of theorizing | 200 |
Chapter 11. | Deliberation | 203 |
1. | A legal example | 203 |
2. | A schematic characterization of deliberation: the deliberative matrix | 211 |
3. | Three sorts of reason: deductive, practical, theoretical | 217 |
4. | An ethical example | 219 |
Chapter 12. | Coherence | 225 |
1. | Coherence accounts and the existence of coherence functions | 225 |
2. | The analogy between deliberation and social choice | 226 |
3. | The analogues of conditions P and D | 231 |
4. | The analogues of conditions U and I | 234 |
5. | The analogue of single-profile neutrality | 241 |
6. | The analogues of Roberts' single-profile conditions | 248 |
7. | Summary and conclusion | 252 |
Chapter 13. | Commensurability | 254 |
1. | Domain restrictions and multi-dimensional conflict | 254 |
2. | Transitivity as commensurability vs. transitivity as coherence | 256 |
3. | Conflict, transitivity as coherence, and self-determination | 260 |
4. | The constitutive status of coherence and the possibility of pluralism | 263 |
5. | Monism, pluralism, and substantive vs. formal unity: an example | 264 |
Part IV. | Knowledge of What Should Be Done | |
Chapter 14. | Skepticism | 273 |
1. | Taking stock | 273 |
2. | The modal structure of deliberation, the existence of a best theory, and skepticism | 274 |
3. | The error theory, and the link to psychological states | 278 |
4. | In pursuit of error: various suppositions about explanatory primacy | 279 |
5. | In pursuit of error: explanatory primacy and debunking explanations | 287 |
6. | The possibility of evaluative knowledge: mere lack of explanatory primacy does not debunk | 290 |
7. | The debunker's dilemma, horn 1: the problematic status of counterevaluative suppositions | 294 |
8. | The debunker's dilemma, horn 2, preliminaries: projection vs. interpretation, and the explanation of supervenience | 295 |
9. | The debunker's dilemma, horn 2, concluded: the counterfactual independence assumption exposed and the naturalist alternative | 302 |
10. | Discriminating debunking and selective skepticism | 309 |
Chapter 15. | Autonomy and Democracy | 314 |
1. | Autonomy without subjectivism | 314 |
2. | The cognitive value of democracy | 322 |
3. | Tracking, debunking, and the democratic division of epistemic labour | 333 |
4. | Democracy and autonomy | 348 |
5. | Personality and polity: the convergence to full structure | 356 |
6. | Intrapersonal structure and distributive justice | 360 |
Epilogue | 383 | |
Notes | 385 | |
Bibliography | 437 | |
Index | 455 |
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