To Lose a Battle: France 1940 Book

A very detailed and well readable account of the Fall of France, including a very good overview of the factors leading to the quick collapse of the French army

Every year, when I went on holiday with my parents, I always remember a particular spot on one of the autoroutes leading to the south of France where a sign points out a fortification claiming that at this point you pass the famous Maginot line. I always wondered how the French, up to this day, are able to still want to point this out to passing tourists when the Maginot line stands for all that went wrong in May 1940.

How was it possible that the German army, with less soldiers and tanks, was able to so quickly defeat the French army, that was considered at that time one of the mightiest armies on the continent? How was it possible that during the whole campaign, they never were able to materialize one counter-offensive or to disrupt the advance of the panzers?

In this book, Alistair Horne gives some good reasons why. First of all, the Maginot line (constructed at the border with Germany but planned up untill the Atlantic) was for the French not only a component of strategy, but a way of life. Second, the weak governments had signed the so called 'Matignon Agreement', promising a forty-hour workweek (whereas the Germans still worked for 60 hours a week), annual paid holidays and further advantages. However, the agreement could not come at a worse time for France, creating economic ills and lowering the French industrial production as 25% lower. Third, strategic thinking had stopped in 1918 and the French still saw war as being done along the lines established in the Great War. Why change, after all they had won, hadn't they?

Starting from 1936, even the French governments couldn't close its eyes anymore and started rearmament. It created two excellent new tanks, but the gravest defects of the French tank force were their poor operating range and the fact that four-fifths of them carried no radio. And due to lack of co-ordination and the hostility of the Popular Front and the 40 hour week, only resulted in the first delivery until a year after the new armamanet programme. The French were rearming, but on a much to slow basis.

Apart from that, the French strategy was still in its 1918 cadres. Charles de Gaulle, after writing his modern ideas in the book Vers l'Armee de Metier was struck from the 1936 promotion list after going against the established militairy thoughts. The German panzers would never be able to break such a sophisticated defense as that of France. And besides, the development of the anti-tank gun had already rendered the panzers obselete?

The role of the French air force was also clearly laid down: preparation for any attack was the work of the artillery and only troop concentrations or columns in the march or retreat were considered suitable targets. On of the serious faults however was the complete inability to appreciate the importance of dive-bombers.

The Germans in the meantime were ready. As in 1914 they were ready to invade France through Belgium, performing a Sichelschnitt through the Ardennes, thougt as imprenetrable by the French. The French were initially not bothered by the crossing of the Meuse, but quickly grew to acknowledge the danger of the break in the lines at Sedan. However, where a quick counteroffensive would have thrown the Germans back after crossing the Meuse with just some small detachments, the French were never able to make a quick response. The armoured divisions (which were the only ones who would be able to block the German panzers) were dispersed instead of concentrated and due to poor communication arrived always to late.

This was the end of the story. The panzers were never serious attacked and were able to drive a split between the southern French army and the northern part, including the BEF and Belgian army. The rest is history. France had fallen.

The book is roughly divided in two parts, the first part dealing with the events running up to the actual invasion in May 1940. The author really captures the underlying reasons of the French defeat. The second part is telling the advance itself, with much detail for the Sedan breakthrough and the subsequent drive to the Channel. Although it praised the German offensive, it also notes the weakness of the plan, causing Hitler to lose the war. There was no follow up for the invasion of Britain. Basically the Germans were surprised by their own succes.

I really enjoyed this book and especially the underlying factors resulting in the French defeat delivered me great insights.