The Pentagon Papers Book

	Preface
	Introduction
1	Origins of Involvement, 1946-1960	1
	Ho Chi Minh's 1946 Appeal for Help	4
	NSC 1952 Policy Study on Southeast Asia	5
	French Seek U.S. Air Intervention at Dienbienphu	11
	U.S. Rejects French Plea	13
	French Response	14
	Instructions to U.S. Delegation to Geneva Conference	14
	Joint Chiefs of Staff 1954 War Plans for Indochina	16
	Geneva Accords, July 1954	18
	U.S. Response to Geneva Accords	21
	Edward Lansdale Report on CIA Operations in Vietnam, 1954-1955	23
	Ambassador Durbrow's Concern About Diem Government, 1960	37
2	John F. Kennedy and the Escalation of the War, 1961-1963	42
	Kennedy Task Force May 1961 "Program of Action"	44
	NSAM 52 May 1961 Program	50
	LBJ May 1961 Report on Asian Trip	51
	Maxwell Taylor Proposes U.S. Combat Troops for Vietnam	55
	McNamara Response to Taylor Proposals	58
	State Department Pessimism on Vietnam	60
	Intelligence Assessment of 1963 Buddhist Protest	62
	Washington Moves Toward Coup	63
	Ambassador Lodge Encourages Coup Planning	65
	CIA Station Chief Assesses Coup Prospects	65
	Lodge Scenario for Removal of Diem	66
	Washington Response to Lodge Proposals	68
	Unravelling of August Coup Plan	69
	Generals Renew Coup Plotting	70
	Washington Response to Minh Overture	72
	Lodge Urges Support for Coup	73
	Washington's Concern About Coup	75
	Lodge Urges Proceeding with Plan	75
	Bundy Outlines Contingency Plans	79
	Lodge Phone Conversation with Diem	81
3	Graduated Response, 1963-1965	83
	McNamara's March 1964 Assessment of Situation in Vietnam	86
	NSAM 288 Plans for Retaliation	93
	U.S. Warnings to North Vietnam	95
	September 1964 Proposals for Escalation	97
	McNaughton Proposals, November 1964	100
	Ambassador Taylor's Meeting with South Vietnamese Generals	103
4	America Goes to War, 1965	107
	Bundy Urges "Sustained Reprisal"	109
	Washington Approves Rolling Thunder	114
	McNaughton's March 1965 Proposals	115
	CIA Assessment of Air War	118
	NSAM 328 Enlarges Ground Forces and Changes Mission	120
	George Ball Opposes Escalation	122
	McNamara Urges Major Expansion of Ground Forces	129
5	Stalemate, 1965-1966	132
	McNamara's November 1965 Assessment of the War	134
	McNamara's Early Doubts	136
	McNaughton Hints at Compromise	137
	Proposal for an Anti-Infiltration Barrier	140
	Johnson Presses for "Coonskins on the Wall"	142
	Walt Rostow on Pol Bombing	144
	JCS Order Pol Attacks	145
	McNamara Seeks to Limit Ground Forces	146
	Westmoreland Asks for Additional Troops	147
	IDA Assessment of the Bombing	148
6	The 1967 Policy Debate	156
	McNamara Opposes Escalation	158
	JCS Oppose Cutback in Bombing	169
	McNamara November 1966 DPM	171
	Westmoreland Requests Additional Troops	173
	JCS Support Westmoreland Request	178
	Johnson, Wheeler, and Westmoreland Discuss Force Needs	180
	McGeorge Bundy Opposes Escalation	183
	Enthoven Opposes Increase in Ground Forces	186
	Rostow Analysis of Air War	187
	McNamara Turns Dove	191
	William Bundy Response to McNamara	201
7	The Tet Offensive and the End of Escalation	205
	CINPAC Late 1967 Report on War	208
	Wheeler's Post-Tet Report to President	210
	LBJ's March 31, 1968 Decisions	217
	Glossary	219
	The Pentagon Papers: A Bibliographical Essay	223