The Future's Back : Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory and Crisis Stability after the Cold War Book

Name: The Future's Back : Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory and Crisis
Brand: University Press
SKU: 9780773516069
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The Future's Back : Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory and Crisis Stability after the Cold War, Arguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are not convincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns of interaction between rival nuclear powers. He analyses, The Future's Back : Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory and Crisis Stability after the Cold War

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The Future's Back : Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory and Crisis Stability after the Cold War
Written by author Frank P. Harvey
Published by McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997/09/30
Arguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are not convincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns of interaction between rival nuclear powers. He analyses

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Book Categories

Authors

Tables and Figures

Acknowledgments

Introduction

1 Cumulation in International Relations: Methodological Constraints and Solutions 3

2 Nuclear Deterrence: The Record of Aggregate Testing 19

3 New Directions for Aggregate Testing 47

4 Game Theory and Superpower Rivalry, 1948-88 56

5 U.S.-Soviet Rivalry and Nuclear Deterrence 94

6 Nuclear Stability after the Cold War 112

7 Conventional Deterrence and Compellence Theory: Perspectives on Testing after the Cold War 121

Notes 145

Bibliography 171

Index 191

Title: The Future's Back : Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory and Crisis Stability after the Cold War

Manufacturer:

University Press

Item Number: 9780773516069

Publication Date: September 1997

Number: 1

Product Description: Full Name: The Future's Back : Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory and Crisis Stability after the Cold War; Short Name:The Future's Back

Universal Product Code (UPC): 9780773516069

WonderClub Stock Keeping Unit (WSKU): 9780773516069

Rating: 4/5 based on 1 Reviews

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Category: Media >> Books

Weight: 0.200 kg (0.44 lbs)

Width: 0.000 cm (0.00 inches)

Heigh : 0.000 cm (0.00 inches)

Depth: 0.000 cm (0.00 inches)

Date Added: August 25, 2020, Added By: Ross

Date Last Edited: August 25, 2020, Edited By: Ross

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The Future's Back : Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory and Crisis Stability after the Cold War, Arguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are not convincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns of interaction between rival nuclear powers. He analyses, The Future's Back : Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory and Crisis Stability after the Cold War

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Add The Future's Back : Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory and Crisis Stability after the Cold War, Arguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are not convincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns of interaction between rival nuclear powers. He analyses, The Future's Back : Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory and Crisis Stability after the Cold War to your collection on WonderClub

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	Tables and Figures
	Acknowledgments
	Introduction
1	Cumulation in International Relations: Methodological Constraints and Solutions	3
2	Nuclear Deterrence: The Record of Aggregate Testing	19
3	New Directions for Aggregate Testing	47
4	Game Theory and Superpower Rivalry, 1948-88	56
5	U.S.-Soviet Rivalry and Nuclear Deterrence	94
6	Nuclear Stability after the Cold War	112
7	Conventional Deterrence and Compellence Theory: Perspectives on Testing after the Cold War	121
	Notes	145
	Bibliography	171
	Index	191