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Preface
1. Metatheory: Explanation in Social Science
Explanation of the Behavior of Social Systems
Components of the Theory
Conceptions of the Relations between Micro and Macro Levels
Part I / Elementary Actions and Relations
2. Actors and Resources, Interest and Control
The Elements
Structures of Action
Social Exchange
Simple and Complex Relations
3. Rights to Act
What Are Rights?
How the Free-Rider Problem Is Reduced for Rights
How Does New Information Bring About a Change in the Allocation of Rights?
How Does a Right Change Hands?
Who Are the Relevant Others?
How Are Rights Partitioned, and How Might They Be?
4. Authority Relations
The Right to Control One's Own Actions
Vesting of Authority
Conjoint and Disjoint Authority Relations
Transfer of One Right or Two: Simple and Complex Authority Relations
Limitations on Authority
Slavery
Authority without Intentional Exercise
5. Relations of Trust
The Placement of Trust
Actions of the Trustee
Multiple Trustors and Public-Goods Problems
Part II / Structures of Action
6. Systems of Social Exchange
What Is Money?
Media of Exchange in Social and Political Systems
Exchanges within Systems
7. From Authority Relations to Authority Systems
The Law of Agency
Sympathy and Identification: Affine Agents
Simple and Complex Authority Structures
The Internal Morality of an Authority System
8. Systems of Trust and Their Dynamic Properties
Mutual Trust
Intermediaries in Trust
Third-Party Trust
Large Systems Involving Trust
9. Collective Behavior
General Properties of Collective Behavior
Escape Panics
Bank and Stock Market Panics
Acquisitive Crazes
Contagious Beliefs
Hostile and Expressive Crowds
Fads and Fashions
Influence Processes in Purchasing Decisions, Voting, and Public Opinion
Specific Predictions about Collective Behavior
10. The Demand for Effective Norms
Examples of Norms and Sanctions
Distinctions among Norms
The First Condition: Externalities of Actions and the Demand for a Norm
What Constitutes Social Efficiency?
Systems of Norms
11. The Realization of Effective Norms
An Action-Rights Bank
Social Relationships in Support of Sanctions
Free Riding and Zeal
Heroic versus Incremental Sanctioning
How Are Sanctions Applied in Society?
Emergence of Norms about Voting
Internalization of Norms
12. Social Capital
Human Capital and Social Capital
Forms of Social Capital
Relative Quantities of Social Capital
The Public-Good Aspect of Social Capital
The Creation, Maintenance, and Destruction of Social Capital
Part III / Corporate Action
13. Constitutions and the Construction of Corporate Actors
Norms and Constitutions
Positive Social Theory
Change in a Disjoint Constitution: American High Schools An Optimal Constitution
Who Are the Elementary Actors?
14. The Problem of Social Choice
Partitioning of Rights to Indivisible Goods
Constitutional Issues in Partitioning Rights to Control Corporate Actions
Intellectual Puzzles concerning Social Choice
Emergent Processes and Institutions for Social Choice
Ethical Theory: How to Determine the Right Action
Executive Decision Making
Community Decision Making and Conflict
Characteristics of Noninstitutionalized Social Choice
15. From Individual Choice to Social Choice
The Problem of Independence from irrelevant Alternatives
Tournaments as Institutions for Social Choice
Multi-Stage versus Single-Stage Processes for Social Choice
The Nature of Rights in Social Choice
16. The Corporate Actor as a System of Action
Weberian Bureaucracy in Theory and Practice
The Format Organization as a Specification of Transactions
Modes of Maintaining Viability in Formal Organizations
Explicit and Implicit Constitutions
Structures That Link Interest and Control
General Principles for Optimizing the Corporate Actor's Internal Structure
The Changing Conception of the Corporation
17. Rights and Corporate Actors
Allocation of Corporate Rights and the Public-Goods
Problem 451 Exercise and Exchange of Rights
The Drift of Power toward Actors Having Usage Rights
Withdrawal of Usage Rights through Voice and Exit
18. Revoking Authority
Theories of Revolution
Comparative Macrosocial Research: Inequality, Economic Development, and Repressiveness
Ideology in Revolutions
A Theoretical Framework of Revolution
19. The Self
Problems Inherent in a Unitary Actor
Functional Components of the Self
The Dual Role of Interests
Processes of Change inside the Actor
Corporate Actors' Changes in Self
Part IV / Modern Society
20. Natural Persons and the New Corporate Actors
Individual Sovereignty
Changing Conceptions of Sovereignty
Emergence of Corporate Actors in Social Organization and Law
Examples of Interactions of Natural Persons and Corporate Actors
Types of Interactions Involving Corporate Actors and Persons
Displacement of Nature by Human Constructions
21. Responsibility of Corporate Actors
Responsible Actions of Natural Persons
Social Origins of Corporate Responsibility
Internal Changes and Corporate Responsibility
Tax Laws and Social Norms
Free-Rider Problems for Corporate Responsibility
Corporate Responsibility in Sum
What Conception of the Corporation Is Best for Natural Persons?
22. New Generations in the New Social Structure
The Conflict between the Family and the Corporation
Distribution of Income to Children in the New Social Structure
Consequences of the New Social Structure for Social Capital
The Direct Impact of the Two Social Structures on the Next Generation
23. The Relation of Sociology to Social Action in the New Social Structure
The Social Role of Social Theory
The World of Action and the World of the Discipline
The Structure of Society and the Nature of Applied Social Research
Applied Social Research and the Theory of Action
What Should Applied Social Research Be Like?
What Research Is Missing?
24. The New Social Structure and the New Social Science
The Replacement of Primordial Social Capital
Independent Viability, Global Viability, and Distribution in the New Social Structure
Modes of Organizing Action
Nation-States versus Multinational Corporations, or Voice versus Exit
The New Social Science
Part V / The Mathematics of Social Action
25. The Linear System of Action
Two-Person Exchange System with Divisible Goods
Restrictions on the Utility Function
Beyond a Two-Person System of Action
The Competitive Equilibrium and the Linear System of Action
Further Derivations and Use of the Model
Economic and Psychological Properties of the Utility Function
Open Systems
Appendix: An Iterative Method tar Solving for r or v Given X and C
26. Empirical Applications
Estimation of Value with Perfect-Market Assumptions
Estimation of Value When There Are Two Resources and More Than Two Actors
Estimation of Value When There Are More Than Two Resources
Arbitrary Zero Points for Resources
Sampling and the Importance of the Population and Resource Distributions
Estimation of Interests
27. Extensions of the Theory
A Perfect Social System
Psychic Investment
Dependence of Events
Partitioned Systems of Action
Losses in Exchange between Actors and between Resources
28. Trust in a Linear System of Action
Introducing Mistrust into a System
Lack of Complete Trust in Larger Systems
29. Power, the Micro-to-Macro Transition, and Interpersonal Comparison of Utility
Interpersonal Comparison
Cardinal Utility
Power, through a Market and Otherwise
30. Externalities and Norms in a Linear System of Action
When Will Actions Having Externalities Be Taken? The Coase Theorem Revisited
Externalities and Level of Affluence
What Is Meant by Efficiency?
The Rationality of Norms
31. Indivisible Events, Corporate Actors, and Collective Decisions
When Will Control of Events Be Collectivized?
The Constitutional Stage
The Postconstitutional Stage
Social Choice by Various Decision Rules
Conflict
32. Dynamics of the Linear System of Action
Exchange with Two Actors and Two Resources
Change in Resources Held by One Actor
Movement of a Resource among Actors
Logical Constraints on Transition Rates in Pairwise Exchange Systems
A Description of the Path of Values: Walrasian Adjustment
Dynamics of Systems with Social-Structural Barriers
How Do Power of Actors and Values of Events Change?
33. Unstable and Transient Systems of Action
Single-Contingency and Double-Contingency Collective Behavior
Transfer of Control in Single-Contingency Panics
Double-Contingency Panics
Evolution of Strategies
34. The Internal Structure of Actors
Event Outcomes as Actions of a Corporate Actor
Corporate Outcomes and Public-Good Problems
The Value of Resources and the Interests of a Corporate Actor
Subjective and Objective Interests of a Corporate Actor
The Internal Structure of Persons as Actors
References
Name Index
Subject Index
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Add Foundations of Social Theory, Combining principles of individual rational choice with a sociological conception of collective action, James Coleman recasts social theory in a bold new way. The result is a landmark in sociological theory, capable of describing both stability and change, Foundations of Social Theory to the inventory that you are selling on WonderClubX
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Add Foundations of Social Theory, Combining principles of individual rational choice with a sociological conception of collective action, James Coleman recasts social theory in a bold new way. The result is a landmark in sociological theory, capable of describing both stability and change, Foundations of Social Theory to your collection on WonderClub |