Explorations into Constitutional Economics Book

	Preface	vii
Part I.	Theoretical Foundations: The Constitutional Paradigm
1.	Predictive Power and the Choice among Regimes	3
2.	The Achievement and Limits of Public Choice in Diagnosing Government Failure and in Offering Bases for Constructive Reform	24
3.	Rational Choice Models in the Social Sciences	37
4.	Man and the State	51
5.	Constitutional Economics	57
Part II.	Applications
	Voting
6.	Toward a Theory of Yes-No Voting	71
7.	What If There Is No Majority Motion?	87
8.	Voter Choice: Evaluating Political Alternatives	101
9.	Vote Buying in a Stylized Setting	116
	Monetary and Fiscal Constitution
10.	Predictability: The Criterion of Monetary Constitutions	129
11.	An Outside Economist's Defense of Pesek and Saving	149
12.	Can Policy Activism Succeed?	154
13.	Ideas, Institutions, and Political Economy: A Plea for Disestablishment	165
	Public Goods Supply
14.	The Evaluation of Public Services	178
15.	A Note on Public Goods Supply	194
16.	Breton and Weldon on Public Goods	208
17.	Public Goods in Theory and Practice	213
18.	Convexity Constraints in Public Goods Theory	218
	Taxation and Public Debt
19.	Fiscal Choice through Time: A Case for Indirect Taxation?	228
20.	Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility	246
21.	Tax Instruments as Constraints on the Disposition of Public Revenues	264
22.	Dialogues Concerning Fiscal Religion	283
23.	Proportional and Progressive Income Taxation with Utility-maximizing Governments	294
24.	Coercive Taxation in Constitutional Contract	309
25.	Organization Theory and Fiscal Economics: Society, State, and Public Debt	329
	Property Rights and Externalities
26.	Private Ownership and Common Usage	344
27.	Notes on Irrelevant Externalities, Enforcement Costs, and the Atrophy of Property Rights	359
28.	The Institutional Structure of Externality	371
29.	The Coase Theorem and the Theory of the State	385
30.	Entrepreneurship and the Internalization of Externalities With	401
31.	Market Failure and Political Failure	418
	Index	431