Delivering on Debt Relief: From IMF Gold to a New Aid Architectur

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Foreword ix
Preface xi
1 Introduction 1
Group A versus Group B 1
Expanding Debt Relief 4
Reinventing the Aid Architecture 6
Appendix 1.1 Ten Questions about Debt and Debt Relief 8
2 The HIPC Initiative: Background and Critiques 13
The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 19
Recent Debt Relief Initiatives 21
The Enhanced HIPC Framework 26
Critiques of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative 33
3 The Case for More 41
Debt Sustainability 41
The Millennium Development Goals 44
4 What Form of More? 49
Political Resonance 50
Additionality 55
Redistribution 61
Efficiency 66
Country Selectivity 75
Summary 78
5 Deepening and Extending Debt Reduction 79
Deeper Relief 80
Making More Countries Eligible 86
A Contingency Facility 91
Financing More Debt Relief 93
6 A New Aid Architecture 101
The HIPC Procedure 102
Grants, Not Just Loans 106
Incremental Proposals to Increase Donor Accountability 108
Donor Incentives for Selectivity 110
Exploiting Multilateralism: The Common Pool 113
Sovereign Debt: Building on the HIPC Initiative 114
7 Conclusions 115
Whether to Extend More Debt Relief 116
How to Extend the HIPC Initiative 117
Cost of the Extensions 117
Toward a New Aid Architecture 118
Appendix A Multilateral Institutions Participating in the HIPC Initiative 119
Appendix B Countries Classified by Income 121
Appendix C Odious Debt 123
References 147
Glossary 151
Index 153
Tables
Table 2.1 Resource flows to HIPCs and all developing countries, 1980-99 18
Table 2.2 Growth in HIPCs and other developing countries, 1980-99 19
Table 2.3 Heavily indebted poor countries 29
Table 2.4 Debt statistics for HIPC countries 30
Table 4.1 Project versus nonproject activity: Commitments of bilateral ODA to the HIPCs, 1973-99 70
Table 5.1 Additional reduction needed for post-decision point HIPCs that are above the 2 percent threshold 82
Table 5.2 Cost to bring all non-decision point HIPCs below the 2 percent debt-to-GNP threshold 83
Table 5.3 Cost of Eurodad proposal for limiting debt service 85
Table 5.4 Debt indicators for potential HIPCs, 1999 87
Table 5.5 Debt statistics for other low-income countries, 1999 88
Table 5.6 Cost to bring all low-income countries below the 2 percent threshold for debt service to GNP and 150 percent threshold for debt to exports 90
Table 5.7 Hypothetical cost of contingency procedure 94
Table 6.1 Continued aid dependence of post-completion point HIPCs 105
Table C.1 Odious debt: Commitments to countries considered "Not Free" and "Corrupt" 124
Table C.2 Resource flows and other indicators for the Democratic Republic of Congo, 1970-99 125
Table C.3 Resource flows and other indicators for Kenya, 1970-99 129
Table C.4 Resource flows and other indicators for Nicaragua, 1970-99 133
Table C.5 Military and social spending by Nicaragua, 1979-99 137
Table C.6 Resource flows and other indicators for Pakistan, 1970-99 140
Table C.7 Resource flows and other indicators for Uganda, 1970-99 144
Figures
Figure 2.1 ODA loans to sub-Saharan Africa, 1970-99 16
Figure 2.2 World Bank and IMF loan disbursements to low-income countries, 1970-99 17
Figure 2.3 Debt ratios of HIPCs and other developing countries 20
Figure 2.4 Evolution of ODA disbursements from EU countries, 1980-99 22
Figure 2.5 Breakdown of debt by creditor, nominal debt stock, 1999 24
Figure 2.6 Realized and projected annual growth rates, 1980-2015 39
Figure 3.1 Ratio of NPV of debt-to-export for HIPCs at the decision point, projections, and past export trends 44
Figure 3.2 "Group of Eight" by Dan Wasserman 45
Figure 4.1 Aid to low-income countries in per capita terms, 1990-99 57
Figure 4.2 The increasing aid coordination challenge 67
Figure 4.3 Aid and debt, sub-Saharan Africa, 1977-87 and 1988-98 77
Figure 5.1 Cost estimates to public sector 95
Figure 5.2 Authors' proposals 100
Boxes
Box 1.1 The enhanced HIPC Initiative 2
Box 2.1 A short history of sovereign lending and default 14
Box 2.2 Debt initiatives 23
Box 3.1 The annual cost of achieving the Millennium Development Goals 47
Box 4.1 Aid accounting and debt relief 56
Box 4.2 The Central American Bank for Economic Integration 60
Box 4.3 The IMF's future role in development 62
Box 4.4 Aid does work--if... 64
Box 6.1 The PRSP challenge: Avoiding business as usual 103
Box 6.2 Assessing country performance: Selectivity using what measures? 111

Title: Delivering on Debt Relief: From IMF Gold to a New Aid Architecture

Item Number: 9780881323313

Publication Date: April 2002

Number: 2

Product Description: Full Name: Delivering on Debt Relief: From IMF Gold to a New Aid Architecture; Short Name:Delivering on Debt Relief

Universal Product Code (UPC): 9780881323313

WonderClub Stock Keeping Unit (WSKU): 9780881323313

Rating: 3/5 based on 2 Reviews

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Category: Media >> Books

Weight: 0.200 kg (0.44 lbs)

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Heigh : 8.900 cm (3.50 inches)

Depth: 0.400 cm (0.16 inches)

Date Added: August 25, 2020, Added By: Ross

Date Last Edited: August 25, 2020, Edited By: Ross

Price	Condition	Delivery	Seller	Action
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Mimi Hunt

reviewed Delivering on Debt Relief: From IMF Gold to a New Aid Architecture on August 24, 2007

Delivering on Debt Relief: From IMF Gold to a New Aid Architecture

I haven't been able to find another book quite like this one, I'm so glad the author wrote this book! He exposes the unethical and shady ways that Salliemae dominates the market for student loans (paying universities to make them the primary lender, acquiring other companies, acquiring guarantors and getting the profit for payments made on defaulted loans, etc.). He also addresses how bad things are in the student loan world. Did you know that once you consolidate your loans, it is against the law to re-consolidate them with another lender for a lower rate? Free market principles have no hold in the student loan market, where universities, the department of education, and guarantors are in SallieMae's pocket.

Most frightening is that if you default on your loan, your life is basically over. You can't declare bankruptcy and discharge that debt, even if with private loans. If you don't pay, your wages can be garnished, your disability check or social security can be dipped into, and even your employment can be in jeopardy. In some cases, people have had their licenses to practice medicine taken away because they defaulted on student loans. Collections agencies have contacted borrower's employments to have their wages garnished or get them fired. Just how are they supposed to pay back on these loans if their employment is taken away? Sallie mae is more profitable when people default on their loans, and the author has brought to light incidents where Sallie Mae has allowed loans to go quietly into default for this reason. They don't want you to pay off your debt, they make FAR more money if you are paying them for life.

The bottom line is that all consumer protections have been taken away. When people are committing suicide or leaving the country to escape the stress of their ballooned debt that they've made good efforts to pay, it's time for a change. EVERYONE with student loans should read this book, if nothing else to realize how bad things can get if you get into a rough patch where you can't pay on your loans.

The author was slightly repetitive about some information, but the information he provided was valuable enough to overlook the weaknesses in his writing.

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	Foreword	ix
	Preface	xi
1	Introduction	1
	Group A versus Group B	1
	Expanding Debt Relief	4
	Reinventing the Aid Architecture	6
Appendix 1.1	Ten Questions about Debt and Debt Relief	8
2	The HIPC Initiative: Background and Critiques	13
	The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries	19
	Recent Debt Relief Initiatives	21
	The Enhanced HIPC Framework	26
	Critiques of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative	33
3	The Case for More	41
	Debt Sustainability	41
	The Millennium Development Goals	44
4	What Form of More?	49
	Political Resonance	50
	Additionality	55
	Redistribution	61
	Efficiency	66
	Country Selectivity	75
	Summary	78
5	Deepening and Extending Debt Reduction	79
	Deeper Relief	80
	Making More Countries Eligible	86
	A Contingency Facility	91
	Financing More Debt Relief	93
6	A New Aid Architecture	101
	The HIPC Procedure	102
	Grants, Not Just Loans	106
	Incremental Proposals to Increase Donor Accountability	108
	Donor Incentives for Selectivity	110
	Exploiting Multilateralism: The Common Pool	113
	Sovereign Debt: Building on the HIPC Initiative	114
7	Conclusions	115
	Whether to Extend More Debt Relief	116
	How to Extend the HIPC Initiative	117
	Cost of the Extensions	117
	Toward a New Aid Architecture	118
Appendix A	Multilateral Institutions Participating in the HIPC Initiative	119
Appendix B	Countries Classified by Income	121
Appendix C	Odious Debt	123
	References	147
	Glossary	151
	Index	153
	Tables
Table 2.1	Resource flows to HIPCs and all developing countries, 1980-99	18
Table 2.2	Growth in HIPCs and other developing countries, 1980-99	19
Table 2.3	Heavily indebted poor countries	29
Table 2.4	Debt statistics for HIPC countries	30
Table 4.1	Project versus nonproject activity: Commitments of bilateral ODA to the HIPCs, 1973-99	70
Table 5.1	Additional reduction needed for post-decision point HIPCs that are above the 2 percent threshold	82
Table 5.2	Cost to bring all non-decision point HIPCs below the 2 percent debt-to-GNP threshold	83
Table 5.3	Cost of Eurodad proposal for limiting debt service	85
Table 5.4	Debt indicators for potential HIPCs, 1999	87
Table 5.5	Debt statistics for other low-income countries, 1999	88
Table 5.6	Cost to bring all low-income countries below the 2 percent threshold for debt service to GNP and 150 percent threshold for debt to exports	90
Table 5.7	Hypothetical cost of contingency procedure	94
Table 6.1	Continued aid dependence of post-completion point HIPCs	105
Table C.1	Odious debt: Commitments to countries considered "Not Free" and "Corrupt"	124
Table C.2	Resource flows and other indicators for the Democratic Republic of Congo, 1970-99	125
Table C.3	Resource flows and other indicators for Kenya, 1970-99	129
Table C.4	Resource flows and other indicators for Nicaragua, 1970-99	133
Table C.5	Military and social spending by Nicaragua, 1979-99	137
Table C.6	Resource flows and other indicators for Pakistan, 1970-99	140
Table C.7	Resource flows and other indicators for Uganda, 1970-99	144
	Figures
Figure 2.1	ODA loans to sub-Saharan Africa, 1970-99	16
Figure 2.2	World Bank and IMF loan disbursements to low-income countries, 1970-99	17
Figure 2.3	Debt ratios of HIPCs and other developing countries	20
Figure 2.4	Evolution of ODA disbursements from EU countries, 1980-99	22
Figure 2.5	Breakdown of debt by creditor, nominal debt stock, 1999	24
Figure 2.6	Realized and projected annual growth rates, 1980-2015	39
Figure 3.1	Ratio of NPV of debt-to-export for HIPCs at the decision point, projections, and past export trends	44
Figure 3.2	"Group of Eight" by Dan Wasserman	45
Figure 4.1	Aid to low-income countries in per capita terms, 1990-99	57
Figure 4.2	The increasing aid coordination challenge	67
Figure 4.3	Aid and debt, sub-Saharan Africa, 1977-87 and 1988-98	77
Figure 5.1	Cost estimates to public sector	95
Figure 5.2	Authors' proposals	100
	Boxes
Box 1.1	The enhanced HIPC Initiative	2
Box 2.1	A short history of sovereign lending and default	14
Box 2.2	Debt initiatives	23
Box 3.1	The annual cost of achieving the Millennium Development Goals	47
Box 4.1	Aid accounting and debt relief	56
Box 4.2	The Central American Bank for Economic Integration	60
Box 4.3	The IMF's future role in development	62
Box 4.4	Aid does work--if...	64
Box 6.1	The PRSP challenge: Avoiding business as usual	103
Box 6.2	Assessing country performance: Selectivity using what measures?	111