The Common but Differentiated Responsibility Principle Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Regulatory and Policy Aspects Book

Preface xi

Abbreviations xiii

Chapter 1 Introduction 1

1.1 Introduction to Common but Differentiated Responsibility 1

1.1.1 Two Constitutive Elements: Common and Differentiated 1

1.1.2 Two Frames for the Setting 4

1.1.2.1 Sustainable Development 4

1.1.2.2 The North-South Divide 8

1.1.3 Philosophical Background: Justice Requires Reciprocity and Proportional Treatment 11

1.2 About the Study 14

1.2.1 Research Task 14

1.2.2 Focus 16

1.2.3 Approach and Methodology: Realism and Pragmatism as Key Premises 23

Chapter 2 Background for and Development of CBDR 35

2.1 Levels of Development 35

2.1.1 International Law 35

2.1.1.1 Sovereign Equality and Reciprocity 35

2.1.1.2 Movement for New International Economic Order 39

2.1.1.2.1 The Idea of and Demands Presented for NIEO 39

2.1.1.2.2 The Outcome of the Movement 42

2.1.1.2.3 Conclusion 45

2.1.1.2.3.1 Reasons for Failure and Lessons Learned 45

2.1.1.2.3.2 Implications for International Environmental Law 47

2.1.1.3 International Trade Regime: Special and Differential Treatment under GATT/WTO 49

2.1.1.3.1 History of the Doctrine 49

2.1.1.3.2 Principles and Provisions of SDT: An Overview 54

2.1.1.3.3 Future Prospects 58

2.1.1.3.4 Assessment of Special and Differential Treatment Under International Trade Regime 63

2.1.2 International Environmental Law 67

2.1.2.1 Common Heritage and Concern of Humankind 67

2.1.2.2 Birth and Evolution of CBDR 69

2.1.2.2.1 Stockholm and Rio Conferences: Recognition and Definition 69

2.1.2.2.2 WSSD: Commitment Re-affirmed 75

2.1.3 Trend: Contextualization of International Law 77

2.1.3.1 Contextualization and Fragmentation ofInternational Law 77

2.1.3.2 CBDR in the Contextualization Development 80

2.2 The Aim: Correcting Existing Inequities 82

2.2.1 Philosophical Perspectives in the Background 82

2.2.1.1 John Rawls: Justice as Fairness in Burden-Sharing 82

2.2.1.2 Prospects of Distributive Justice in International Law 88

2.2.2 State Inequality 90

2.2.3 Fairness in International Law 94

2.2.3.1 Implications of Fairness to International Law 94

2.2.3.2 Principle of Equity in International Adjudication, A Short Note 96

2.2.4 Equity in International Environmental Law: Characteristics and Feasibility 99

2.2.4.1 Equality, Equity-Justice and Fairness 99

2.2.4.2 Different Perceptions of Equity in International Environmental Lawmaking 102

2.2.4.3 Equity Guiding to Fairer MEAs 106

Chapter 3 Operationalization of CBDR in Multilateral Environmental Agreements 111

3.1 Methods and Practice of Differentiation 111

3.1.1 Introduction 111

3.1.2 Differentiated State Obligations 114

3.1.2.1 Delayed Implementation and Exemptions in Montreal Protocol 114

3.1.2.2 Differentiated Obligations under the Global Climate Change Regime 119

3.1.2.2.1 Regime Based on CBDR 119

3.1.2.2.1.1 Development of the Regime 119

3.1.2.2.1.2 Differentiation of Commitments as the Foundation of International Climate Regulation 122

3.1.2.2.2 Burden-Sharing under Kyoto Protocol 126

3.1.2.2.2.1 Negotiation Outcome 126

3.1.2.2.2.2 Special Case: The EU Burden-Sharing Agreement 131

3.1.2.2.2.3 Flexible Mechanisms 134

3.1.2.3 Differentiation under Acid Rain Regime 137

3.1.2.4 Differentiated State Obligations under Some Other MEAs 141

3.1.2.5 Loopholes and Reservations in Treaties 144

3.1.3 Re-distribution of Resources 148

3.1.3.1 Generally on Capacity-Building 148

3.1.3.2 Global Environment Facility 153

3.1.3.3 Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund 156

3.1.3.4 Financial Mechanisms under Other MEAs 161

3.1.3.4.1 UNFCCC 161

3.1.3.4.2 From Ramsar to Stockholm Conventions 164

3.1.3.5 Technology Transfer 170

3.1.3.5.1 General 170

3.1.3.5.2 Application in MEAs 174

3.2 Categorization of Countries for Differentiation 178

3.2.1 General Considerations 178

3.2.2 Need for Dynamic Definitions 181

3.2.3 Practice under MEAs 185

3.2.4 For Comparison: Practice under GATT/WTO 190

3.2.5 Implications and Needs for Future 192

Chapter 4 CBDR: A Regulatory and Regime Management Analysis 197

4.1 Responsibility for Problems 197

4.1.1 Polluter-Pays Principle 197

4.1.1.1 Background and Functions 197

4.1.1.2 PPP and Differentiation of Commitments 202

4.1.2 Ideas of Liability and Compensation and Global Environmental Problems 204

4.2 Fair Burden Sharing 210

4.2.1 General Considerations 210

4.2.2 Economic Criteria 212

4.2.3 Potential to Mitigate 216

4.2.4 Rights-Based Allocation 217

4.2.5 Contraction and Convergence and Other Formulas 221

4.2.6 Concluding Remarks 226

4.3 Heterogeneity of States in Bargaining 229

4.3.1 State Heterogeneity and Relative Bargaining Strength 229

4.3.2 Experience under Montreal Protocol 231

4.3.3 Experience under UNFCCC and Cartagena Protocol 234

4.4 Role of Information 234

4.4.1 Information Asymmetries 234

4.4.2 Holding-Out and Rent-Seeking 239

4.4.3 Opportunity Costs 240

4.5 Transaction Costs and Complexity 241

4.5.1 Negotiation and Administrative Costs 241

4.5.2 Disadvantages of Complex Treaty Design 242

4.6 Suspicions: Precedents Created for Future Negotiations 246

4.6.1 General 246

4.6.2 Experience under International Environmental Regimes 247

4.7 Perverse Interests 249

4.7.1 Valuations 249

4.7.2 Experience under Montreal Protocol and UNFCCC 251

4.8 State Self-interests and Dependence Relationships 253

4.8.1 Reluctance of the Developed World to Allow for CBDR 253

4.8.1.1 General 253

4.8.1.2 Experience under Montreal Protocol and UNFCCC 256

4.8.2 Search for Concrete Global Benefits 259

4.8.2.1 Introduction 259

4.8.2.2 Experience under GEF and International Environmental Regimes 261

4.8.3 More Immaterial Interests of Developed Countries at Stake 263

4.8.4 Compliance 264

4.8.4.1 Linking Duties of Developed and Developing Countries 264

4.8.4.2 Experience under MEAs 268

4.8.5 Funding Issues and Technology Transfer 272

4.9 Effectiveness of a Regime Applying CBDR 274

4.9.1 General Considerations 274

4.9.2 Uniformity in Obligations is Inefficient 275

4.9.3 Environmental Effectiveness 277

4.9.3.1 Introduction 277

4.9.3.2 Concerns of Environmental Effectiveness under MEAs 278

4.9.4 Economic Effectiveness 283

4.9.5 Normative Effectiveness 287

4.9.6 Other Forms of Regime Effectiveness 288

4.9.7 Concluding Remarks 290

4.10 sCompleting Remarks: CBDR as a Regulatory Instrument in MEAs 291

Chapter 5 Status and Future Prospects of the Principle of CBDR 293

5.1 Legal and Policy Status 293

5.1.1 An Emerging Rule of Customary International Law? 293

15.1.1.1 Introduction 293

5.1.1.2 CBDR and Requirements for Customary Law Status 297

5.1.1.3 CBDR as Customary Law 301

5.1.2 A Guiding or Legally Binding Principle? 306

5.1.2.1 Interpretative and Guiding Value 306

5.1.2.2 Functions of Environmental Principles Including Principle of CBDR 308

5.1.2.3 Principles and Policies 310

5.1.2.4 Scholarly Opinions on CBDR as a Principle of International (Environmental) Law: A Commentary 313

5.1.2.5 CBDR: Principle or Policy? 325

5.2 Implications of CBDR for Future International Environmental Regimes 330

5.2.1 Risks to Multilateral Environmental Cooperation 330

5.2.2 Solidarity Fosters Cooperation 332

5.2.3 Promotion of Equality and Participation 336

5.2.4 Dynamism of CBDR: Post-2012 Negotiations on Climate Change 338

Chapter 6 Completing and Concluding Remarks 351

6.1 Leadership, Partnership and Globalization in International Environmental Cooperation 351

6.2 Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes 354

6.3 Patterns of Burden-Sharing 356

6.4 Influence of Justice on MEAs 359

6.5 Feasibility of CBDR as a Principle of International Environmental Law 361

6.5.1 Realization of the Principle 361

6.5.2 Feasibility as Effectiveness 363

6.6 Final Conclusion 364

Bibliography 369

Tables of Materials 401

Table of Treaties 401

Other International Legal Documents 404

International Soft Law Documents 404

Table of Cases 405

Index 407