The Reality of Meaning and the Meaning of Reality Book

	Note from the Author
1	What Meaning Is Not	1
1.1	The Project	1
1.2	Sentences in Society	2
1.3	Sentences on Their Own?	10
1.4	Sentences in the Brain	15
1.5	Cognitive Role and Sentences in the Head	18
1.6	The Irreducibility of Truth	22
2	Wittgenstein's Solution	27
2.1	Seeing as	27
2.2	Use	35
2.3	Aesthetics as Semantics	38
3	Things In and Out of the Mind	45
3.1	Denotation and Representation	45
3.2	Things	48
3.3	Worlds in the Head	53
3.4	Worlds and Their Dwellers	59
4	Sense and Reference	66
4.1	Is It the Same Thing?	66
4.2	Sense: An Identity Function	70
4.3	Reference: Another Identity Function	72
4.4	Definite Descriptions and Indexicals	78
4.5	Sentences and Truth Conditions	85
5	Odd Beliefs	90
5.1	The Belief World	90
5.2	In Pierre's World	95
5.3	Mabel's Troubles	98
5.4	Shem's Arithmetic	102
5.5	Can Identity Be Contingent?	105
5.6	Identity and Metaphor	107
6	Mental States	113
6.1	From Language to Mind	113
6.2	First-Level Intentionality: Meaning	114
6.3	Second-Level Intentionality: Factual Belief	119
6.4	Desire, Perception, Sensation	123
6.5	Emotion	129
7	Action	136
7.1	Intention	136
7.2: Volition	A Third-Level Intentionality?	143
7.3	Wayward Causal Chains	149
8	Scientific Realism	156
8.1	From Mind to World	156
8.2	Prediction and Other Constraints	156
8.3	Is There an Empirical Support for Science?	162
8.4	An Unknown Identity Is Useless for Confirmation	166
8.5	Eliminative Materialism, or, Is This a Science?	168
8.6	Science and Naive Realism	170
8.7	The Success of Science Argument Again	173
9	Metaphysical Realism	175
9.1	Semantic Cosmetics	175
9.2	Intuitionism and Understanding	179
9.3	Verificationism Old and New	182
9.4	The Status of Observation	186
9.5	Romanticism Vindicated	190
	Notes	193
	Index	215