Never again! Book

I like Mackie, but he was way too obsessed with his error theory and tried to encompass all sorts of doctrines under its guise. His reading of Humean moral judgments is that of an error theorist. Unsurprisingly, Mackie adopted a similar position with respect to Locke's secondary qualities in another of his books. Mackie seems to neglect the fact that Hume took moral distinctions to have a reality of their own, while Boyle (and potentially Locke himself) never doubted the reality of secondary qualities. Oh well...

Besides this minor point, this book remains a robust introduction to Hume's moral theory, one that came highly recommended from my professor in the history of moral philosophy. Furthermore, the chapter where the metaethical theories of Hume's predecessors are discussed (people like Hobbes, Clarke and Hutcheson) is great.