Non-State Threats and Future Wars Book

"The Changing Face of War" has proven to be a polemical work of modern military history, perhaps by one of the most polemical yet eminent contemporary military historians. Starting with an invocation to understand present circumstances by understanding the past, Professor Van Creveld's starting point is "Where did 20th Century Warfare come from?" It seems, however, that he is really more interested in analyzing 21st Century military events, most especially the American campaigns in the Middle East, rather than a profound or detailed analysis of the origins of war in the 20th Century.

This work suffers from some imprecision, some hyperbole, and a good deal of contrarian'almost revisionist'predilection which strikes as politically inspired. Additionally, I could not determine the central argument and driving force behind "The Changing Face of War;" to me, the imperative to understand the past in order to place the present into context and focus is not an argument but a fact. The book culminates in a criticism of contemporaneous American counter-insurgency efforts which, as deservedly as they may certainly prove to be, read more like screed than history. This critique aside, Van Creveld has many strengths to offer as well. He is one of the few to make what seems an obvious point: studying failure is not nearly as helpful in promoting success as studying success. He is right that the recent history of "Counter-Insurgency" from the perspective of the counter-insurgent is largely an object lesson in military failure and Americans seemed obsessed with revisiting the military aspects of past counter-insurgencies (mostly unsuccessful). Unfortunately, I think Van Creveld could do more here in linking modern counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism; they are virtually indistinguishable to Americans today while other traditions of violence like those in Russia do not even consider such combat actions war but rather "counter-banditry" operations (which are therefore not subject to the laws of war and its ethical and legal restrictions upon violence). Such distinctions would be of great use and benefit in such a discussion. Similarly, while I share Van Creveld's underlying suspicion of the "science" of war which permeates this book, this theme is never drawn out. Van Creveld correctly understands that war is much more than simple battlefield calculus and therefore he seeks to understand the much broader social, cultural, and political dimensions of war. As such, I think it would help if he approached this directly as his title, "The Changing Face of War," implies this, being an allusion to John Keegan's seminal "The Face of Battle." This shortcoming underscores my largest disappointment of "The Changing Face of War": the conflation of war, warfare, battle, the political, and policy. In sum, the understanding of war, warfare, and battle'let alone confronting their "faces"'is an enormously challenging undertaking.