The robot in the garden Book

Proffers the claim that there is no non-circular, non-self-referencial defense for the reliability of our sense perception - we merely accept that it is acceptable - and we must.

Something from Plantinga that reflects the implications of the issue; "Take other sources of knowledge: rational intuition, memory, and perception, for example. Can we show by the first two that the third is in fact reliable--that is, without relying in anyway on the deliverances of the third? No, we can't; nor can we show by the first and third that memory is reliable, nor (of course) by perception and memory that rational intuition is. Nor can we give a decent, non-question-begging rational argument that reason itself is indeed reliable. Does it follow that there is something irrational in trusting these alleged sources, in accepting their deliverances? Certainly not. So why insist that it is irrational to accept, say, the Internal Testimony of the Holy Spirit [or Altered/Alternate States of Consciousness, or Entheogens, or Human-Animal communications, or Sinai, etc, etc] unless we can give a rationally conclusive argument for the conclusion that there is indeed such a thing, and that what it delivers is the truth? Why treat these alleged sources differently? Is there anything but arbitrariness in insisting that any alleged source of truth must justify itself at the bar of rational intuition, perception and memory [considering the 'strength' of the 'arguements' for their reliability]? Perhaps God has given us several different sources of knowledge about the world, and none of them can be shown to be reliable using only the resources of the others [also to Clouser/Dooyeweerd's critique/s of reductionism]. "Darwin, Mind and Meaning".