Game-Theoretic Models Of Bargaining Book

Preface;

1. Editor's introduction and overview Alvin E. Roth;
2. Disagreement in bargaining: models with incomplete information Kalyan Chatterjee;
3. Reputations in games and markets Robert Wilson;
4. An approach to some noncooperative game situations with special attention to bargaining Robert W. Rosenthal;
5. Infinite-horizon models of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information Drew Fudenberg, David Levine and Jean Tirole;
6. Choice of conjectures in a bargaining game with incomplete information Ariel Rubinstein;
7. Analysis of two bargaining problems with incomplete information Roger B. Myerson;
8. Sequential bargaining mechanisms Peter C. Cramton;
9. The role of risk aversion in a simple bargaining model Martin J. Osborne;
10. Risk sensitivity and related properties for bargaining solutions Stef Tijs and Hans Peters;
11. Axiomatic theory of bargaining with a variable population: a survey of recent results William Thomson;
12. Toward a focal-point theory of bargaining Alvin E. Roth;
13. Bargaining and coalitions K. G. Binmore;
14. Axiomatic approaches to coalitional bargaining Sergiu Hart;
15. A comment on the Coase theorem William Samuelson;
16. Disclosure of evidence and resolution of disputes: who should bear the burden of proof? Joel Sobel;
17. The role of arbitration and the theory of incentives Vincent P. Crawford.