Walls and Vaults: A Natural Science of Morals (Virtue Ethics According to David Hume) Book

Preface xi

I Introduction 1

1 The Business of Moral Philosophy and the Question, "Why Be Moral?" 1

2 Hume's Questions in Moral Philosophy and His Answers-in Brief 4

3 Coming Chapters 8

Part 1 Analysis and Metaphysics-Semantics, Pragmatics, and Logic 11

II Virtue and Vice 13

1 David Hume: Virtue Theorist 13

2 What Kinds of Things Are Virtues and Vices According to Hume 16

3 Hume's First Question in Order of Explanation: What Is It for Something to Be a Virtue? 18

4 The Nature or Definition of Virtue and Vice: Hume's Hypothesis in Brief 19

5 Detailing Hume's Account 29

6 The Nature of Virtue According to This Hypothesis 45

7 Illusory Qualities 50

8 "A Controversy Started of Late" (David Hume) and "The Moral Problem" (Michael Smith) of Late 52

Appendix Virtuous and Vicious Actions 58

III Moral Judgments 62

1 They Are Not, Although They Could Be, What They Seem to Be 62

2 The Good Sense of Sentences of Moral Judgments 67

3 The Bad Sense of Moral Judgments: Their Bogus Propositional Conjuncts 78

4 Difficulties for Nonpropositional Theories of Moral Judgments 83

5 The Function of Moral Language 95

IV Species Bias 102

1 Humes Hypotheses Concerning Moral Distinctions and Judgments 102

2 Evidence for This Theory 103

3 The Human Species Bias of Morality 105

4 Hume's Theory Predicts and Explains This Bias and Addresses Its Proper Measure 107

5 The Moral Innocence of Plants and Animals 108

6 Animal Moralities 110

7 Bias Toward Us of Another Kind 111

Part 2 Normative Theories 113

V Virtues Agreeable and Useful 115

1 A Utilitarian Theory of the Virtues 115

2 Methodology 118

3 Of What Primarily Is Hume's Delineation ofPersonal Merit a Theory? 125

4 Extending the Theory to Culture-Specific, Local, and Cult Virtues 130

5 The Case for This Utilitarian Theory of the Virtues Is Very Strong 134

6 Relations of Hume's Theory of the Virtues and His Theory of Virtue 135

7 Intrinsic Logic of These Theories 138

8 Tables of Virtues 142

9 Piety 144

10 Gratitude 145

11 Strength of Mind 147

12 Justice and Benevolence 148

Appendix A Contents of Volume II of Essays and Treatises, 1777, the "Advertisement" and "A Dialogue" 156

Appendix B Essentials of Hume's Theory of Morals, But for Its Semantics 161

VI Hume's Theory of Right and Wrong Actions 162

1 Attributing a Theory to Hume 162

2 A Sometimes Actual-Rule, Sometimes Straight Act, Pure Utilitarian Principle of "Right" and "Wrong" for Hume 172

3 Ancillary Accounts of 'Rules of Justice' and Extraordinary Cases 177

4 Texts That Can Suggest Modifications 186

5 Difficulties for the Theory Attributed to Hume 189

6 Looking Ahead 195

Appendix A Contractarian Considerations 196

Appendix B Influencing Motives of Right and Wrong 206

Part 3 An Everywhere Relevant Distinction 211

VII That Species of Utility That Attends Justice 213

1 The Utilities of Benevolence and Justice Compared 213

2 Texts for Distinction 214

3 Apparent Paradox Redux and Texts Featuring Variously Moderating Clauses 216

4 Comparisons of Several Ideas of the Utilities of Acts of Justice that Are Constitutive of Useful Systems or Schemes 218

5 Justice Utility Defined 226

6 Not a Vault, But a Pontoon Bridge, or Better, a Fail-Safe Device 227

7 The Two Problems of How This Species of Utility Is Possible 228

VIII The Logical Possibility of Justice Utility 231

1 Argument for This Possibility 231

2 Toward Explanations of This Possibility 253

Appendix A Hume's Corn Case 270

Appendix B Getting in More Corn 274

IX The Real Possibility of Justice Utility: How Systems with It Come to Be and Are Maintained 277

1 We Are Not Out of the Woods Yet 277

2 Problems of Cooperation and Coordination 279

3 How Did Such Schemes, Especially Schemes of Cooperation, Begin? 289

4 As Society Grows These Schemes Are Maintained Largely by Senses of Duty 307

5 Summing Up 317

Appendix A Getting in the Corn Again and Again 319

Appendix B A Three-Person Prisoners' Dilemma in Which Backward-Conditional Resolutions Would Not Redirect Interests 323

Appendix C Circumstances of Justice 330

Part 4 And now at Last the "First" Question 333

X Our Interested Obligation to Virtue: Why Be Moral? 335

1 It Is a Question Best Left to Last 335

2 The Problem of Part II of the Conclusion, Finely Drawn 337

3 Benevolence and Humanity 347

4 The Problem Is "Why Be Just?" 350

5 What Knaves Are Missing 353

6 Elements for a Nonevasive Case For Justice 357

7 The Case for Justice Assembled 363

8 Glaucon's Problem 368

9 Signing Off 373

Appendix A Richard Hare's Approach to the Question "Why Be Moral?" 374

Appendix B An Amendment After Alasdair MacIntyre 376

Appendix C Humean and Platonic Moral Consciences 377

References 381

Name Index 391

Subject Index 395