Bertrand Russell and the Edwardian Philosophers: Constructing the World Book

Introduction

1 Stout's Proto-New-Realism

I Presentations

1.1 Situating G. F. Stout

1.2 Stout's doctrine of primary and secondary qualities

1.3 Stout and the Brentano school

1.4 Representative function of presentations

1.5 Sensible space and real space

1.6 Cook Wilson's geometrical counter-example

II Ideal Constructions

1.7 Stout's central question

1.8 Ideal constructions

2 British New Realism: The Language of Madness

2.1 Stout's criticisms of Alexander

2.2 Alexander's response

2.3 Some general remarks

3 British New Realism: The Language of Common-Sense

3.1 T. P. Nunn and the New Realism

3.2 Nunn and things

3.3 Nunn's Postulate

4 Russell and the Nature of Sense-Data

4.1 Russell and Stout on sensible objects

4.2 Russell, sense-data and sensibilia

5 The Methods of Construction

5.1 Russell's constructions and Nunn's Postulate

5.2 Constructions, psychology and the essence of philosophy

6 The Method of Logical Construction

6.1 A mathematical development

6.2 The principle of abstraction

Conclusion

Notes

Bibliography

Index